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Preface
Beyond Rio+20: Governance for a Green Economy is the second in The Pardee 
Center Task Force Reports series, and, as it happens, the timing for this report 
could not have been better. Recent and upcoming international meetings 
convened by the United Nations are focused on the challenges of actualizing 
the promise of sustainable development, of recreating a world economy that is 
“greener” and more sustainable, and identifying institutional frameworks that 
could help achieve this vision. Marking the 20th anniversary of the historic Rio 
Earth Summit of 1992, the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD)—popularly called Rio+20—has set for itself the goal of deliberating 
upon and designing such an architecture. This Pardee Center Task Force Report 
is a contribution to these deliberations.
We hope that the ideas presented in this Pardee Center Task Force Report will pro-
vide international decision-makers at the United Nations and elsewhere a fresh and 
diverse set of perspectives concerning the ongoing quest for institutional and gover-
nance frameworks that can help foster sustainable development globally. Between 
now and Rio+20, this very topic will be debated many times and in many venues. 
We hope that our early attempt to synthesize some of the lessons from the past 
debates and to present some fresh suggestions for future directions will help inspire 
and inform the important decisions that will be made in the next many months.
The Pardee Center invited an eminent group of thought-leaders from academia, 
civil society, and the diplomacy arena to think about why we face the institutional 
challenges we do and about the type of bold actions and ideas that may move us 
towards an institutional framework that is more conducive to fostering sustain-
able development. This report presents the results of these deliberations. This 
Pardee Center Task Force was convened by Professor Henrik Selin and myself. 
The membership of the Task Force was purposely interdisciplinary, international, 
and intersectoral. All members of the Pardee Center Task Force met at Pardee 
House on September 10, 2010, where initial drafts of their essays were presented 
and discussed. The group also deliberated upon the overall trends and findings 
emerging from the discussions and this became the basis of the synthesis from 
the Task Force co-conveners. In addition to the co-conveners’ synthesis of the key 
ideas emerging from the meeting, this report also includes the thought-provoking 
essays written by each of the experts on the Pardee Center Task Force on different 
aspects of the challenge. Between them, these expert essays capture a rich and 
refreshing diversity of perspectives that we hope policymakers will find useful.
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The mission of the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study 
of the Longer-Range Future is to convene and conduct interdisciplinary, policy-
relevant, and future-oriented research that can contribute to long-term improve-
ments in the human condition. As part of fulfilling its mandate, the Pardee 
Center occasionally convenes groups of experts on pertinent policy issues with 
longer-range impacts. The Pardee Center Task Force Reports present the findings 
and deliberations of these groups in a format designed to speak to the concerns 
of policy practitioners and policy scholars. The views expressed in these reports 
are always those of the individual authors and do not represent the views of 
their home institutions, of the Pardee Center, or of Boston University.
This Pardee Center Task Force Report is just one of several ways the Pardee 
Center is contributing to the deliberations on Rio+20 in particular, and global 
governance in general. The Center also publishes the Sustainable Development 
Insight series of policy briefs on behalf of the Sustainable Development Knowl-
edge Partnership (SDKP) with the United Nations, and has provided a series of 
expert consultations at recent meetings of the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD) on topics related to Rio+20 preparations. 
As co-conveners, Professor Henrik Selin and I are deeply grateful to all the mem-
bers of the Task Force for the time, enthusiasm, and effort they have devoted 
to this report, producing an excellent document on a complex set of issues in a 
short period of time. We would like to especially thank Professor Maria Ivanova 
of the University of Massachusetts at Boston for her participation in part of the 
Task Force meeting and sharing her insightful perspectives and expertise. We 
would also like to thank Cynthia Barakatt and Ellie Perkins for assisting with the 
editing and publication of this report, and Elaine Teng for helping organize the 
Task Force meeting. As Director of the Pardee Center, I would like to express my 
special gratitude to my colleague Henrik Selin for helping conceive and imple-
ment the idea of this Pardee Center Task Force. His patient yet persistent leader-
ship of this effort was crucial to bringing it to completion.
Let me end by congratulating all the Task Force members for having produced a 
timely and intellectually stimulating report. I am certain this report will contribute 
significantly to the deliberations going into Rio+20, and I hope that it will also have 
impacts well beyond that.
Adil Najam 
The Frederick S. Pardee Professor of Global Public Policy  
Director, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future 
Boston University
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Co-conveners’ synthesis 
 
Making sustainable development real: 
institutional architectures for a Green economy
Adil Najam and Henrik Selin
On December 24, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion A/RES/64/236 to organize the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development (UNCSD) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The General Assembly identi-
fied two themes of focus for the conference: First, “a green economy within the 
context of sustainable development and poverty eradication”; and second, “an 
institutional framework for sustainable development.”1 As in all UN processes, 
both themes were extensively—maybe excessively—negotiated and capture a 
measure of intentional ambiguity and breadth to satisfy a very broad range of 
(sometimes contradicting and conflicting) viewpoints and interests. The com-
prehensive preparations for the UNCSD are currently under way, involving a 
multitude of governments and stakeholders. 
UNCSD will be one in a series of UN conferences that aim to focus global politi-
cal attention towards the need for policy interventions in the areas of environ-
ment and development, now commonly called sustainable development. Mark-
ing the 20th anniversary of the landmark “Rio Earth Summit” of 1992 (the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro)—
which itself marked the 20th anniversary of the equally landmark Stockholm 
conference of 1972 (the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
held in Stockholm, Sweden)—the upcoming conference is being popularly 
referred to as “Rio+20.” This title embodies the hope that UNCSD will attract the 
same attention and import as its two illustrious predecessors. Yet, other confer-
ences with similar goals—for example, the less distinguished 2002 conference in 
Johannesburg dubbed “Rio+10” (the World Summit on Sustainable Development) 
or the now largely-forgotten “Stockholm+10” held in 1982 in Nairobi, Kenya—did 
not live up to their own aspirations.2
UNCSD will seek to build on a wide range of past political and organizational 
achievements, but also, more importantly, seek to accelerate progress where a long 
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line of earlier international efforts have come up well short. This is not just an exer-
cise in politics, but of critical importance to people and societies all over the world 
as well as future generations. The two themes were selected by the United Nations 
General Assembly precisely because they are viewed as areas where (a) there is a 
need for global clarity and agreement and (b) there is a perceived potential for real 
change if, indeed, further clarity and agreement are achieved.
Those attending UNCSD—which is technically not yet called a “summit” with 
heads of state and government in attendance, but is likely to become one—will 
seek to arrive at global agreement and decisions within the conceptual frame-
work of sustainable development. In fact, that is already baked into the name of 
the conference. Indeed, from the 1992 Earth Summit onwards, the entire global 
conversation has revolved around the desire to put meaning into the term “sus-
tainable development.” If those government delegates and stakeholder represen-
tatives who go to Rio in 2012 can succeed in constructing a global new deal for 
sustainable development, their time and effort will be well spent and Rio+20 will 
be remembered in the same breath and with the same reverence as the 1992 
Earth Summit and the 1972 Stockholm meeting.3 
the Pardee Center Green eConoMy task ForCe 
As an intellectual contribution to the Rio+20 preparatory process and UNCSD, 
the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-
Range Future convened a small task force of experts to discuss the role of 
institutions in the actualization of a green economy in the context of sustainable 
development. As co-conveners of this group, we brought together stellar experts 
from academia, government, and civil society and asked them to outline ideas 
about what the world has learned about institutions for sustainable development 
from the past, and what we can propose about the governance challenges and 
opportunities for the continuous development of a green economy in the future.
Members of the Pardee Center Task Force met at Boston University on Sep-
tember 10, 2010, to discuss the first drafts of the papers collected in this report 
and to deliberate on the trends in governance and institutional frameworks that 
might inform and influence the decisions to be made at Rio+20 and beyond. Task 
Force Members included: Dr. Tom Bigg (International Institute for Environment 
and Development), Prof. Elizabeth DeSombre (Wellesley College), Mark Halle 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development), Dr. Hans Hoogeveen  
(Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality), Dr. Saleemul Huq 
(International Center for Climate Change and Development), Bernice Lee 
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(Chatham House, the Royal Institute for International Affairs), Prof. David Levy 
(University of Massachusetts at Boston), Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz (International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development), Prof. Adil Najam (Pardee Center, 
Boston University), Prof. Henrik Selin (Pardee Center, Boston University), Prof. 
Stacy D. VanDeveer (University of New Hampshire), Dr. Patrick Verkooijen (World 
Bank), and Prof. Paul Wapner (American University).
The Task Force members were encouraged to think big and think bold. We 
asked them to be innovative in their ideas, and maybe even a little irreverent 
and provocative. We have not tried to force a consensus; far from it, we have 
encouraged a variety and diversity of views. Nor was the idea to define a set of 
precise “recommendations”; that, after all, is the work of the preparatory negotia-
tors between now and 2012. Rather, we set the goal of identifying broad themes 
and trends in the area of global governance and institutional frameworks for 
sustainable development and the actualization of a green economy. We placed 
a premium on “newness” of ideas. Instead of shackling Task Force members in 
repetitive debates on the minutia of what may or may not be done by or to a 
 particular UN agency, or what a green economy is, or how the existing system 
can be tweaked at its periphery, we asked them to identify key lessons that have 
the greatest potential to trigger bold and systemic change—not just at Rio+20, but 
beyond that. We asked them to consider trends and ideas that match the scale of 
the challenges that the planet faces today. 
We realize that the political will for implementing some of the ideas presented in 
this report may not yet be available. We also realize that many of these ideas are 
bold, but not necessarily new. But our goal here is to lay out a big picture view for 
Rio+20 negotiators and to articulate bold visions of the global ambition that they 
should be addressing. Converting this into a set of practical policies and specific 
measures is a next step for the international community. We hope that this contri-
bution from the Pardee Center Task Force can be of assistance in this endeavor.
This opening chapter provides our (the Task Force co-conveners’) synthesis of the 
discussion at the Task Force meeting and outlines our understanding of the key 
ideas and insights that emerged from those deliberations. There was no attempt 
to force a negotiated consensus on these points and they are our interpretation 
of the intense, informed, and far-reaching discussion. 
To capture a more detailed sense of the very rich ideas brought to the table by 
the Task Force members, included in this report are each of their “think pieces.” 
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These essays—which look at critical dimensions of transitioning to and eventu-
ally maintaining a green economy in a world of sustainable development—
informed the Task Force discussion and should be read as important comple-
ments to the views presented in this introductory chapter. 
Five+1 suGGestions For rio+20 
Building on the papers collected in this report, and even more on the enriching 
discussion at the September meeting, we have synthesized five+1 ideas that 
Rio+20 negotiators should keep in mind. These are big and somewhat general-
ized ideas, but they all have significant implications and can—and should—
inform the more specific policies and programs that might emerge from Rio+20. 
One. Think boldly and move incrementally. Discussions of institutional reform 
have sometimes been described as an exercise in “rearranging the deck chairs 
on the Titanic.”4 Any institutional reform process must begin with a recognition 
of the urgency for action. It must also begin with a commitment to the proposi-
tion that we need fundamental shifts in our political and economic practices if 
we are to avoid significantly accelerated ecological damage with disastrous con-
sequences (already experienced by many) for people and societies. The enormity 
of the challenge calls for bold thinking, but it should not paralyze action just 
because big change is often difficult to achieve quickly. 
There is a need, instead, for what some participants called a strategy of “radi-
cal incrementalism”—recognizing and strengthening those elements within the 
existing institutional architecture that work, identifying the strategic direction 
of change, and implementing measured and pragmatic shifts that can begin 
moving the system in that direction. Progressively evaluating the implementa-
tion and progress of such measures and carefully adding to them to bring about 
the desired shifts is an important component of this process. One example of 
this would be to break the deadlock that often arises when we search for a single 
“perfect” solution by the adoption of a “portfolio approach” that uses a combina-
tion of initiatives to raise a variety of resources including monetary resources, 
knowledge resources, capacity development, public support, and awareness-
raising for effective global action on forests. 
Another example of the benefits of radical incrementalism would be the much-
stalled debates on creating a new international environmental organization mod-
eled at least in part on the World Trade Organization. The debate has not only 
remained inconclusive but regularly saps energy away from the needed reform 
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with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)—especially in terms 
of strengthening its funding arrangements and consolidating various treaty sec-
retariats—for which there is great and urgent need and on which there is much 
international agreement. The idea that Rio+20 should lead to a stronger, and not 
a weaker, UNEP is already broadly accepted and should not be held hostage to 
the debate about the designs of a superorganization for the environment. The 
benefits of a radical incrementalism approach should not be lost in the debate 
on institutional reform.  
Two. Take economic policy seriously. The proposition that the world needs to 
move towards a “green” economy implies that the economy we have is not working, 
at least not for the environment and future generations.5 Change is required, there-
fore, in economic policy institutions as much as in environmental ones. A genuine 
transition to a green economy 
needs to involve fundamental 
changes to both macro-eco-
nomic and micro-economic 
conditions—and, therefore, 
institutions. Business as usual 
with respect to economic 
policy is not a viable alterna-
tive to meet the challenges of 
the future. The fact that recent economic upheavals have left the global economy 
in a state of flux is a massive challenge but can also be an opportunity in that the 
perceived need—and possibly the appetite—for change is more widely accepted.
The most obvious case for a shift towards a green economy is in macro- 
economic policy instruments relating to structures and principles for international 
trade and finance issues. For example, the role of trade in resources—espe-
cially in energy-related resources and also including the security implications 
of resource trade—is central to a green economy. Any shift in this area will 
require carefully crafted incentives to align international markets simultane-
ously towards environmental and resource goals. At the micro-economic level, 
the institutional challenge is to create individual incentives (including negative 
ones) to realign consumption and production decisions that can have significant 
environmental and economic ramifications. 
A central challenge for Rio+20, therefore, is not only to think creatively about 
economic policy but to engage international economic institutions to do so. While 
The proposition that the world needs to 
move towards a “green” economy implies 
that the economy we have is not working, 
at least not for the environment and future 
generations. Change is required, therefore, 
in economic policy institutions as much as 
in environmental ones.
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the necessity of such engagement is now understood by environmental as well as 
economic decision-makers, making it real will not be easy because the incentives 
for such engagement do not yet exist. The same economic crisis that makes the 
case for change in economic institutions also makes such change more difficult to 
undertake. Rio+20 creates an opportunity to bring environmental and economic 
institutions together at a common platform where world leaders—to whom both 
sets of institutions are ultimately responsible—can lay out a program for such 
collaboration and begin removing the current disincentives for cooperation. A 
good goal for Rio+20 would be to at least begin the realignment of institutional 
incentives to facilitate the achievement of a goal that was already agreed upon at 
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit but has not yet been achieved: making environmental 
considerations central to our global economic decision-making.
Three. Recognize what is working and what is not working. There is no need 
to re-invent the wheel. There are already a number of public and private sector 
initiatives and partnerships that seek to promote a transition to a green economy 
world. At the same time, current organizations, policies, and practices must be 
subject to critical evaluation and changed if they stand in the way of the realiza-
tion of a green economy. Furthermore, activities and regulations across organiza-
tions, states, and issue areas must be coordinated. Policy goals should be formu-
lated clearly and followed by monitoring and reporting (related to discussions 
about targets and timetables). There should be actual consequences for failing to 
meet agreed-upon goals and targets.
The desire to fundamentally redesign things, to create new institutions without 
first thinking about what will happen to old ones, and to simply assume that 
the problems that have plagued institutions in the past will somehow disappear 
in the future remains as prevalent as it is misguided. Rio+20 negotiators will be 
well-advised to resist the temptation. For example, the period right before and 
right after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was extremely productive in the negotia-
tion of new instruments to deal with emerging problems. There is now a variety 
of such instruments available for a range of pressing issues, including a variety of 
financial mechanisms (although many have few or no resources). The challenge 
now is no longer of creating new instruments, but of making the existing ones 
effective and functional. 
This is particularly relevant to the question of international environmental gov-
ernance. We feel that a more fruitful discourse for Rio+20 would be to meaning-
fully enhance the efficacy of the main elements of the system of international 
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environmental governance as it now exists. For example, we believe that there is 
a need to (a) focus on strengthening UNEP—especially in terms of giving it finan-
cial stability, authority, and dependability—so that it can effectively deal with 
the responsibilities that member states have been piling upon it; (b) return to the 
original design mandate of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) 
and make it a review mechanism for progress towards sustainable development; 
and (c) accelerate the process of rationalization of multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) through consolidation and better linkages.
Four. Make implementation the focus. The period right before and after both 
the 1972 Stockholm conference and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit saw a frenzy of 
new international treaty-making and institution-building for the environment.6 
As already mentioned, that has now given us a rich ediface of institutions and 
instruments that will be central to creating and managing a green economy. 
However, the system as it has evolved remains focused on negotiation rather 
than on implementation. A functional green economy will require that societies 
shift their attention much more towards implementation. Rio+20 provides an 
ideal opportunity to accelerate this transition. There has been growing restless-
ness amongst industrialized and developing countries alike—although for dif-
ferent reasons—to make implementation a more central focus, and UNCSD can 
become the marker that signifies this shift in attention.
A global green economy will necessitate an emphasis on implementation and 
on implementation coordination. Such a focus involves at least two important 
changes. First, it will require better incorporating public, private, and civil 
society actors who are closer to implementation, including at the national and 
sub-national levels. This will require multilevel governance from major intergov-
ernmental forums down to town halls and households. The subsidiarity principle 
should guide policy and management efforts, dealing with each issue at the 
lowest, most appropriate level to bring decision-making as close as possible 
to each citizen. Second, implementation requires evaluation, monitoring, and 
accountability. At each level, accountability issues are crucial to ensure change 
and implementation. This includes thinking hard and carefully about what kind 
of accountability mechanisms are needed and how they may be established. 
To this end, a host of scientific, economic, and political information needs to be 
generated and shared in an open and transparent manner.7
Five. The state remains central but non-state actors have to be better 
accommodated. A focus on green economic issues highlights the importance 
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of markets and consumers to both ecology and politics. However, governments 
remain—and will remain—central to this enterprise. There is a tendency (often 
by those outside of governments) to downplay the importance of states; there is 
also a tendency (often amongst those within governments) to push the much of 
the responsibility for action and change on to non-state institutions. Both tenden-
cies should be rejected.
While the members of this Task Force have highlighted—and celebrated—the 
importance of broadening the institutional tent and incorporating market as well 
as citizen institutions more effectively into the global governance enterprise, we 
remain emphatic on the continuing centrality of the state. The model here is not 
as much of state responsibility being “replaced” or “taken over” by other institu-
tions; it is, instead, state responsibility evolving to (a) become an enabler of more 
and better action by non-state actors and (b) develop the ability to work in con-
cert with non-state institutions. Both are already happening and Rio+20 should 
be structured as a forum to demonstrate this evolution. As the 1972 Stockholm 
conference and the 1992 Earth Summit are remembered for the breakthroughs 
they made in accommodating ever-larger numbers of civil society organizations 
into the global discourse, Rio+20 should set for itself the goal of developing and 
deploying new and expanded ways of making the engagement with citizen and 
market groups deeper and more directly related to the implementation chal-
lenges.
Just as the state has to learn how to create a space where markets and citizens 
can spur institutional innovation at a planetary scale, it also has to retain and 
assert its role as rule-setter and enforcer. This is already evident in the area of cli-
mate change and the creation of carbon markets—markets that can neither oper-
ate nor be created independent of state action—and will become increasingly 
important in the management and greening of natural resource supply chains. 
As these market instruments may become defined more and more by national 
security concerns, the importance of the state will increase—not diminish—in the 
evolving institutional needs of the planet.
And all of the above needs to be incorporated within the context of the realiza-
tion that the state itself has changed over time, and certainly the structure of 
states that make up the international system has. No single bloc of countries 
or region holds all the answers. But certainly compared to 1972 and 2002, 
the North today is a little less “North” and the South a little less “South” than 
before. As global power balances shift, as corporations as well as citizens and 
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their consumption become more global and more central to the global enter-
prise, international politics and policy are forced to confront new realities 
about “North-South” differences. Neither is ready to wither away, but both have 
evolved—as have the relations both have to the many non-state actors critical to 
the realization of a green economy. 
Five+1. Put equity at the center. Finally, and overarching and incorporating all 
of the first five ideas, we make a concerted and strong argument that equity and 
human well-being must be the central and unwavering goals of Rio+20. A green 
economy and any institutions devised for it must make their core focus the well-
being of people—of all people, 
everywhere—across present 
and future generations. That 
essential idea puts the notion 
of equity—intra- as well as 
inter-generational equity—
smack at the center of the 
green economy enterprise. It 
also brings to the fore the cen-
trality of consumption ques-
tions, not only among nations but within societies. It would be a folly to forget 
that a green economy demands not just “green consumers” but “green citizens.”
The proximate goal in the creation of a green economy is the notion of making 
the economy more ecologically efficient—meeting our economic needs without 
compromising our ecological integrity. But the ultimate goal is to do so in a way 
that the needs of all people—today, and in the future—can be met and sustained. 
That, after all, is the central premise of sustainable development. Therefore, a 
deep commitment to fairness and social justice is central to the green economy 
transformation. Indeed, a key role of institutional frameworks required for a 
green economy is to maintain a focus on equity. It is not just fitting, but neces-
sary that Rio+20 be a forum that helps ensure that the desire for ecological 
efficiency complements, not displaces, the commitment to intra- and inter-
generational equity.
a Final Word
Both the number of people who still live in abject poverty and the rapid increase 
in the number of people who engage in high-consumption lifestyles raise crucial 
challenges for change. Rio+20 delegates should seek to craft a global new deal 
A green economy and any institutions 
 devised for it must make their core focus 
the well-being of people—of all people, ev-
erywhere—across present and future gener-
ations. That essential idea puts the notion of 
equity—intra- as well as inter-generational 
equity—smack at the center of the green 
economy enterprise.
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for sustainable development; a deal that could finally help bridge the North-
South divide by tackling poverty as well as over-consumption, environmental 
degradation as well as social justice, and greenness of the economy along with 
sustainable livelihoods.
Many of the ideas presented in this synthesis and the subsequent papers are 
not new per se. Versions of many green economy ideas have been debated for 
decades, and will continue to be debated, as they should. However, as the prepa-
rations for the UNCSD continue, we hope that this report presents some ideas 
whose time has come (again). It has been said many times before, but it will 
hopefully inspire action this time: more aggressive policy change for sustainable 
development and implementation is needed.
The following chapters detail many ideas and summarize a wealth of lessons 
from the past as well as visions of the future. The above synthesis should not be 
read as a summary of these ideas (in fact, it is not that at all), but as an invita-
tion to explore the rest of the report in more detail. We hope that the reader will 
find these ideas as useful and stimulating as we have. Our Task Force views this 
report as an early and initial contribution to the discussion on Rio+20, and we 
remain committed to active participation in that dialogue. It is, after all, a discus-
sion about all our shared futures.
1  UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/236, adopted 24 December 2009. 
2  Najam, A.  2005. Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Partici-
pation to Engagement. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 5(3): 303–321; Najam, 
A. et al., 2002.  From Rio to Johannesburg: Progress and Prospects. Environment, 44(7): 26–38; Linnér, B-O. and H. 
Selin. 2005. The Road to Rio: Early Efforts on Environment and Development, in A. Churie Kallhauge, G. Sjöstedt, 
and E. Correll (eds.) Global Challenges: Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development. London: 
Greenleaf Publishing.
3  Munoz, M. and A. Najam. 2009. Rio+10: Another World Summit. Sustainable Development Insights, No. 2, 
November 2009. Boston Univeristy: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. 
4  Najam, A., M. Papa, and N. Taiyab. 2006. Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda. Winnipeg, 
Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
5  Najam, A., D. Runnalls, and M. Halle. 2007. Environment and Globalization: Five Propositions. Winnipeg, Canada: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
6  Selin, H. and B-O. Linnér. 2005. The Quest for Global Sustainability: International Efforts on Linking Environ-
ment and Development. CID Graduate and Postdoctoral Fellow Working Paper No. 5. Cambridge, MA: Science, 
Environment and Development Group, Center for International Development, Harvard University.
7  Najam, A. and M. Halle. 2010. Global Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Accountability. Sustainable 
Development Insights, No. 5. Boston Univeristy: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range 
Future.
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1.  Global environmental Governance  
for a new Green economy
by Elizabeth R. DeSombre
What role will be required of global institutions in managing a new green 
economy as it emerges (or in encouraging it to emerge) in the next 20 to 40 
years? While there are many ways institutions could be structured to support a 
new green economy, their primary role is likely to be a coordinating one. Citi-
zens and states need to determine what this green economy looks like; the main 
role for institutions is to support its implementation. That coordination done by 
institutions will involve both environmental regulation itself and the economic 
adjustments necessary when the environmental regulation is incomplete. 
Global environMental reGulation
The first role required of institutions is one they are already attempting to play: 
coordination of the information, negotiation, and implementation related to 
changing environmental behavior globally. As more environmental problems are 
seen to be global in causes or effects, action by individual states is no longer a 
realistic way to address them. 
Despite the shortcomings 
international institutions face 
in operating in an anarchic 
world where states can opt 
out of participation—or, 
perhaps, even because of these shortcomings—they play an invaluable role in 
moving the world toward behavior changes necessary to mitigate the negative 
human impact on the global environment.
Institutions, first, can play a central role in the generation and dissemination of 
information. They can work to decrease uncertainty. Most environmental agree-
ments begin by creating scientific assessment bodies as a part of the institutional 
structure of the agreement. These scientific committees study the resource in 
question, determining the level and cause of environmental harm. Associated 
As more environmental problems are seen 
to be global in causes or effects, action by 
individual states is no longer a realistic way 
to address them.
12   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  March 2011
requirements that states examine and report on their own behavior and envi-
ronmental conditions generate further information to use in evaluating a given 
problem. The recent trend toward creating general framework conventions with-
out substantive obligations for states reflects situations in which policymakers 
argue that there is insufficient evidence of environmental damage, or its human 
causes, to justify costly action. In many issues, such as ozone depletion and acid 
rain, the scientific processes in these institutions informed states that environ-
mental damage was more extensive than they realized, and states were willing 
to change their behavior once they understood the severity of the environmental 
problems.
The second primary role environmental institutions play is in coordinating the 
negotiations in which states collectively decide what the response should be 
to the global environmental problems in question. The process of negotiation 
often involves tradeoffs in the search for mutually beneficial arrangements (or 
determining least-common-denominator acceptability). State preferences may 
be malleable, however, in light of new information or a reshaping of concerns of 
states so that they become interested in an issue they had previously considered 
unimportant. The role of international institutions in lowering the transaction 
costs of conducting such discussions across many individual states should not be 
underestimated, and a skilled leader of negotiations can help shape what states 
are willing to agree to.
Finally, an essential role of international institutions is to increase the likelihood 
that states will live up to their commitments to protect the environment. An 
institution can do so by increasing transparency; in other words, by making it 
easier for others to know when actors are, or are not, living up to their obliga-
tions. Reporting requirements, for example, make it easier to determine when 
states are not doing what they have agreed to do. Increasingly intrusive types of 
monitoring (such as mandating observers on fishing vessels) have recently been 
created within existing institutions to overcome the potential unreliability of self-
reporting. The European agreements on acid rain include a monitoring process 
that is able to evaluate the accuracy of emissions data reported by states, and 
although it is not directly used to do so, the fact that it can be is likely to increase 
reliability of reported information. Institutions can also increase the likelihood of 
implementation by establishing penalties for those who do not follow the rules 
set by the institution. Though strong enforcement mechanisms are rarely found in 
international environmental institutions, the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species has called for the cessation of all species trade with some 
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states, for example, with poor records of upholding the requirements of the agree-
ment. The possibility of such enforcement, or simply of the shaming that comes 
from not upholding agreements, may work to increase implementation.
eConoMiC Coordination in resPonse to GaPs in reGulation
The more interesting—because it is currently underdeveloped—coordinating role 
that institutions will likely be called upon to play in a new green economy is to 
manage the adjustments needed when global regulation is imperfectly imple-
mented. As is already evident, some states are more willing to move ahead at 
implementing (or even agreeing to) environmental regulation than others. That 
unevenness is perhaps necessary: those who regulate first can be the source of 
innovation (which can make it easier for others to follow) or inspiration (espe-
cially if changing behavior does not have the dire economic consequences in the 
long-term that its detractors predict) to encourage others to follow the same path.
Over the long run, adaptation to new ways of doing business that are better than 
current practices for protecting the environment is unlikely to have dramatic 
economic disadvantages at the state or global level. But in the short run there 
are good reasons that changing behavior can be costly for those who do, and 
potentially even devastating for some local businesses; this is particularly true if 
the adoption of environmental rules is uneven across states.  
The trick to encouraging some states to become early adopters of regulations 
that protect the global (rather than just local, which they might be willing to 
do on their own) environment is to decrease the global economic disadvantage 
from doing so. Institutions can play an important role in coordinating accept-
able international responses 
to the perceived inequity that 
results from uneven adoption 
of environmental measures. 
This coordination can help 
persuade more states to take 
the risk of adopting envi-
ronmental measures, even when it is not clear that everyone will do so. And, it 
can reduce the chaos triggered by the inevitable political responses that states 
undertake when obligations are unevenly adopted.
There are at least two different ways that institutions can manage this coordi-
nation: via trade measures or financial measures. Trade measures require the 
Institutions can play an important role 
in coordinating acceptable international 
responses to the perceived inequity that 
results from uneven adoption of environ-
mental measures.
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institutions that manage global or regional free trade to organize or acquiesce to 
measures allowing states to discriminate against or impose countervailing duties 
against products produced in cheap, environmentally harmful ways. Although 
there are those who anticipate the impossibility of such approaches within the 
current system of trade governance, there are actually several approaches that 
might be compatible with underlying World Trade Organization (WTO) goals and 
priorities, and indications that the evolution of WTO processes on these issues 
would make such approaches increasingly possible.
The first trade approach is through the use of economic sanctions (restrictions 
in trade). There is plenty of evidence that these sanctions can play an important 
role in an environmental protection strategy. In some cases, domestic environ-
mental protection is enabled by the assurance to domestic industry that it will 
not be disadvantaged by competition from those who do not have to undertake 
costly environmental regulation. In other cases, states have been persuaded to 
join international environmental agreements by the prohibition of trade advan-
tages to those outside of the agreement. 
By some measures, the WTO has not looked kindly on efforts by states to 
impose restrictions in trade based on the environmental conditions of produc-
tion. There have been several high-profile cases in which the WTO has rejected 
such attempts. But the ways in which it has done so, and the statements the 
WTO has made even in the cases where these measures have been rejected, 
have laid the groundwork for the conditions of acceptable restrictions in trade 
for environmental reasons.1
Within its findings against these particular trade measures, the dispute settle-
ment process elaborates an increasing acceptance of environmental protection 
as a legitimate reason for restricting trade, as long as restrictions on trade are 
applied in a non-discriminatory way, are designed specifically for environmental 
protection, and are accompanied by multilateral attempts to address the envi-
ronmental issue. More recent efforts to construct multilaterally based restrictions 
on trade (such as the rules of the International Commission on the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tuna that require member states only to land, transship, or import 
tuna caught within the organization’s rules and similar ones undertaken by the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources) have 
been deemed by the WTO Secretariat to “provide examples of appropriate and 
WTO-consistent (i.e., non-discriminatory) use of trade measures in multilateral 
environmental agreements.”2 And in particular, the lack of any serious challenge 
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to multilateral organizations that use trade—in some cases, like with the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) where trade restrictions are its core method of operation—suggests the 
general acceptance of such strategies when undertaken in a multilateral context.
The second approach is through the use of countervailing duties, to be applied in 
circumstances when states are subsidizing their goods or “dumping” products on 
foreign markets at below-cost prices. It is possible to conceptualize production of 
products in environmentally harmful ways as being produced with a subsidy (or, 
in some cases, sold below what the cost would be were environmental standards 
adopted), especially if there is a broader global institutional process, as discussed 
in the first part of this essay, to create and oversee the regulation that some states 
are not adopting.  
Article 16 of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade indicates that states 
must avoid granting any form of income or price support “which operates 
directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from . . . its territory.” The 
agreement recognizes that granting such subsidies can harm other contracting 
parties and “may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.” 
In particular, parties are required to cease granting such subsidies, directly or 
indirectly, on products other than primary products, and to apply subsidies to 
primary products only where doing so does not result in giving that party a 
“more than equitable share of world export trade in that product.” Article Six 
defines dumping as the process “by which products of one country are intro-
duced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the 
products” and disallows it. 
Both of these articles refer to the price of the good. One measure of whether a 
good is being dumped is whether it is being sold for less than the price being 
paid for the good on in its domestic market. Subsidies are indirectly considered 
as things that result “in the sale of such a product for export at a price lower than 
the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic mar-
ket.”3  Neither of these definitions quite fits the situation when a state implicitly 
subsidizes its industries by not internalizing the externalities of environmental 
costs into production costs, but the other elements of the definition fit this pro-
cess well.
Article Six in particular suggests a way out of the current dilemma, by allowing 
countervailing duties to be assessed on goods that are improperly subsidized, or 
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dumped.  This type of duty is defined as a “special duty levied for the purpose of 
offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manu-
facture, production or export of any merchandise.”4 States are allowed to assess a 
duty on these goods that is equal to the margin of dumping—the amount by which 
its price is unfairly lowered. This application of a countervailing duty could be 
sufficient as a domestic political incentive to assure those who will be bound when 
a state undertakes environmental regulation on a global issue that they will not be 
unfairly disadvantaged on the global market by having to meet what is likely to be 
a more costly production process, initially, for whatever goods they produce.
Although either of these approaches could be applied unilaterally by states, 
their orderly implementation would be dramatically improved by their over-
sight under the WTO system whereby unfair uses (or those simply designed as 
restraints of trade) could be adjudicated.
The financial approach is much more complex, and has less of a current trajec-
tory to build on, but would be deeper and far-reaching. This approach recognizes 
that the current ways a country’s wealth is calculated—such as by measuring 
Gross Domestic Product—does not count environmental resources as a form of 
wealth until they are being extracted or processed. In addition, environmental 
disasters actually add to the official record of a state’s wealth by measuring, for 
instance, the economic activity that takes place in response to a major oil spill 
but not the damage to environmental resources that results. Although there are 
major academic discussions 
of environmental versions of 
national accounting, it would 
take agreement by the major 
financial institutions (such as 
the International Monetary 
Fund and probably the World 
Bank) to fundamentally 
change the way we calculate 
national wealth. Although it is difficult to imagine how such a change could hap-
pen, it could have a major effect on how states measure economic and environ-
mental well-being, and therefore on their willingness to take on measures that 
protect the global environment. 
If this kind of shift seems impossible or not useful, a related effort to at least 
include valuation of natural resources in their unused state, and ecosystem 
Although there are major academic discus-
sions of environmental versions of national 
accounting, it would take agreement by 
the major financial institutions (such as the 
International Monetary Fund and probably 
the World Bank) to fundamentally change 
the way we calculate national wealth.
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services provided by these resources, should be used in global financial and 
development institutions considering undertaking or funding projects. A shift in 
the conceptualization of how natural resources are valued can help avoid proj-
ects that destroy or use resources without providing the same value to the local 
or global economy as if they remain whole in their ecosystems.
MovinG ForWard
The key to envisioning a green economy is to imagine the realistic steps to get 
there. This paper outlines reasonable extensions of what existing institutions 
are already doing that would collectively improve the global ability to address 
environmental problems with international components. The collective action 
required can be accomplished by a combination of information, negotiation, 
and implementation assistance from global environmental institutions, as well 
as coordination by global trade, finance, and development institutions, to allow 
states to be the first to take positive action to protect the environment without 
bearing an additional cost for their leadership.
1  DeSombre, E. R. and J. S. Barkin. 2002. Turtles and Trade: The WTO’s Acceptance of Environmental Trade 
Restrictions. Global Environmental Politics 2(1): 12-18.
2  World Trade Organization (WTO). 2000. The Environmental Benefits of Removing Trade Restrictions and Distor-
tions: The Fisheries Sector, Note by the Secretariat. Geneva: WTO 16 October. WT/CTE/W/167.
3  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947: Article 16(B)(4).
4  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947: Article 6(3).
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2.  accountability in the Green economy
by Mark Halle
The opening assumption for this paper is that what is meant by “green econ-
omy”—as for example promoted by United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and many others—is not merely a redecoration of the traditional economy 
with green trimming, but a form of economic organization and priority-setting 
substantially different from the one that has dominated economic thinking in 
the richer countries for the past several decades. Indeed a green economy, thus 
conceived, is more than a re-ordering of priorities; it involves a significant rethink-
ing of the assumptions upon which the traditional economy has been based.1 If 
we are to avoid slip-back towards the traditional economy, strong accountability 
mechanisms will have to be built into the green economy from the start.2
tiMe For soMethinG neW
Although the ideas underlying it have been floating around for years, if not 
decades, the green economy is being promoted—we hope accurately—as “the 
next Big Thing.” As we gaze at the ruins of the neo-liberal economic paradigm, 
it is eminently clear that something new is needed, but it is not always easy to 
let go of the familiar. Neo-liberal thinking has possessed such a strangle-hold 
on development since the days of Thatcher and Reagan and the articulation of 
the “Washington Consensus”3 that it was often considered to have the power of 
a religion. This form of economic organization adopted by—or imposed upon—
countries around the world was deemed to be the only one that worked or had 
a chance of meeting human aspirations within a framework of human freedom.  
So powerful was this conviction among its proponents that some felt that it 
represented “The End of History”4—that with neo-liberal economic organization, 
humanity had emerged onto a sunny plateau on which efficient economic orga-
nization and the interplay of open markets would generate the wealth needed by 
society to address whatever social and environmental issues rose in its margins. 
A priority focus on generating wealth—a prerequisite for all good things—was 
justified because it was the only sound way to generate the wherewithal to 
address other, non-economic issues.
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While neo-liberal economics had its share of critics, it held governments and 
international financial institutions in thrall for decades. Its undeniable results 
in generating wealth allowed it to secure the political power needed to fend off 
criticism. And yet when the collapse came in 2008, the economies foundered 
not because they were undermined by social unrest or overwhelmed by environ-
mental destruction—instead, the neo-liberal system collapsed under the weight 
of its own economic contradictions. Far from permitting governments to address 
social and environmental issues, the fabulous wealth generated through neo- 
liberal economics led to strong pressure for a cut-back in government spend-
ing and services. Partly as a result, the gap widened between those benefitting 
directly from the new wealth and those marginalized from it. And far from lead-
ing to a serene plateau on which sufficient wealth was available to address non-
monetary concerns, the new wealth led to an ever more frenetic effort to grow 
even richer, increasingly through arcane financial instruments well-removed 
from the real economy. Generating wealth became an end in itself.
In seeking a form of economic organization that avoids the mistakes of neo-
liberal economics, some things appear evident. We cannot divorce economics 
from its social and economic underpinnings. On the contrary, we must organize 
the economy in such a way that economic growth leads simultaneously to the 
creation of employment and livelihoods, and to the gradual elimination of social 
marginalization.5 At the same time, it must lead us away from wasteful use of 
the earth’s resources and ecosystems, from the depletion of species, and from air 
and water pollution toward 
clean, renewable, and sustain-
able forms of resource use.6 
These factors are so important 
that economic initiatives 
should be screened for their 
likely impact on employment, 
social inclusion and justice, 
and for their environmental 
footprint. Capacity to generate wealth, competitive efficiency and other tradi-
tional tests of economic activity should not be set aside; simply, these tests must 
be augmented by new tests on the social and environmental side of the equation 
to ensure that a triple win is being pursued and secured.
We cannot divorce economics from its 
social and economic underpinnings. On the 
contrary, we must organize the economy in 
such a way that economic growth leads si-
multaneously to the creation of employment 
and livelihoods, and to the gradual elimina-
tion of social marginalization.
Beyond Rio+20: Governance for a Green Economy     21
What is the Green eConoMy?
One could be forgiven for noting that this formula for a green economy strongly 
resembles the descriptions of sustainable development that have been floating 
around our society for a quarter century and gaining little more than intellectual 
ground—what the French call “succès d’estime” (or “critical success”). Launched in 
1987 by the Brundtland Commission report, calls to bring economic activity into 
a framework bound by the limits of the earth’s ecosystems and to give priority to 
social inclusion and poverty alleviation are now all too familiar. Would it not be 
fair to say that the green economy is nothing more than a re-labeling of “sustain-
able development”?
In some ways it is. If sustainable development has not prevailed over the past 
quarter century, neither has it been discredited. Indeed, the reasons for insist-
ing that development be placed on a sustainable foundation have been growing 
steadily stronger, at least in objective terms. While opinions vary on which of 
the three pillars—economic, social, and environmental—should be given greatest 
attention, there can be no doubt that the traditional economy has collapsed in 
part because it ignored the other two pillars to such an extent.
Therefore, a green economy is one that takes us toward sustainable develop-
ment. Once a green economy is fully in place, we might say that our form of 
development can be deemed sustainable. What, then, is new?  
Perhaps the most significant difference lies in the recognition that an efficient, 
functioning economy is a precondition for addressing the other two pillars of 
sustainability. Much sustainable development activism over the past decades has 
been a thinly disguised effort to give the environment priority over social and eco-
nomic concerns, betraying a deep suspicion of economically driven motivation 
and doubting the attachment of the working masses to the natural environment.7  
A green economy recognizes that it is the form of organization of humankind’s 
economic activity that will, in the end, determine whether or not we are successful 
in addressing the problems of social marginalization and environmental destruc-
tion. If we get the former right, the others have a better chance of following—not, 
it must be stressed, as a result of the wealth generated, but because concern 
for social and environmental matters is an integral part built into the economic 
organization. In a green economy, actions taken to reach economic ends also 
advance social and environmental ones, just as actions taken to meet social and 
environmental ends strengthen and develop the economy.
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Still, what are the boundaries of a green economy? At what point do we say that 
we have one in place? Surely this state would be reached several steps short of 
perfection, but if it is to avoid being specious, the anointment of an economy as 
“green” must meet certain tests in terms of impact on sustainability. But what are 
these tests, and who should apply them?
It is both an advantage and a disadvantage that the movement for a green 
economy is taking place as neo-liberalism lies in ruins, its precepts disgraced 
and its followers inclined to keep their heads down. It is an advantage because 
the world is ripe for new ideas, new thinking, and new approaches. We are in an 
intellectual environment in which assaults on orthodoxy are fair game, where 
we are all casting around for alternatives to the discredited neo-liberal economic 
paradigm. Fresh ideas are welcome; so, to some extent, are ideas that are not 
particularly fresh but that have a new coat of paint and a freshly serviced engine. 
A window of opportunity has edged open, but the gentlest wind could close it 
again unless the opportunity is seized.
In a sense, the disadvantage of the present situation is that the window opened 
before we were truly ready to take advantage of it, and we are all scrambling to 
come up with a robust, complete, and compelling answer to the question: “What 
next?” Unless we do so, the likelihood is that we will all, like victims of an earth-
quake, straggle back to our ruined houses only to rebuild them on the traditional 
design, with the same materials as before, because this is what we know, this is 
what we are familiar with—even if we would be happy to sample new ideas if 
they were genuinely offered.
the neCessity oF aCCountability
Let us imagine that the green economy grows wings and takes off, that the govern-
ments of the world forgather and adopt the basics of the green economy as their 
chosen form of economic organization. Could we then sit back and congratulate our-
selves, confident that social and environmental issues have been set on a firm course 
toward a positive solution, within the framework of a robust and vibrant economy?
Sadly not. If public pledges over the past three decades are anything to go 
by, public declarations—even when accompanied by solemn legal undertak-
ings—are no guarantee that things will move in the direction suggested by the 
public pledge. Indeed, the history of sustainable development is by and large the 
history of unsustainable development, peppered by broken promises. Is there 
anything we can do to change that?
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Early and strong attention to accountability is the only guarantee that prom-
ises of green responsibility in rebuilding the economy will lead—in a reason-
ably straight line—to green 
responsibility dominating 
our economic behavior.8 As 
we design the new green 
economy, we must flank 
that design with a series of 
accountability measures to 
ensure that politicians cannot 
cynically gain points by calling for a green economy while busily rebuilding an 
economy along traditional lines. What sort of accountability measures might be 
envisaged?
Accountability suggests that a price must be paid for not doing what one has 
promised to do. That price must be sufficiently high that ignoring it is some-
thing decision-makers and politicians will not do lightly. Accountability mea-
sures can be in the form of incentives or disincentives. In the case of the former, 
there are clear advantages to be gained from moving quickly and resolutely to 
implement what has been promised, whether these incentives are financial or 
not. In the latter case, there is a clear price to be paid for non-compliance, again 
financial or otherwise.
Within the environment and development worlds, there are many examples of 
the successful use of both ”carrots” and ”sticks” to reduce the accountability gap, 
yet there is no systematic attempt to make these a central point in institutional 
design.9 This leaves politicians with the easy option to look good by promising 
miracles, knowing that they will never be held accountable for failing to deliver. 
When the time comes, the easiest course will simply be to offer new promises.
If the campaign for a green economy is to avoid this fate, it must ensure the 
range of accountability measures is solidly in place as the green economy is 
constructed.10 It must ensure the series of incentive and disincentive measures 
is empowered by the right mix of legislation, institutional tracking mechanisms, 
third party monitoring, and funding mechanisms to allow rewards to be offered 
and legal mechanisms to allow punishment to be meted out. In the course of 
design, it is also fundamental to look at the present range of incentives and dis-
incentives currently driving economic behavior to ensure that these are in line 
with the objectives of the green economy. Where perverse incentives are in place 
As we design the new green economy, we 
must flank that design with a series of ac-
countability measures to ensure that politi-
cians cannot cynically gain points by calling 
for a green economy while busily rebuilding 
an economy along traditional lines.
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(e.g. subsidies, tax breaks, privileged access to capital, etc.), it is important that 
these be removed or restructured until the factors driving personal behavior or 
consumer choice are aligned with the needs of the green economy.
It is vital that we gather best practices in this field, assess what has worked and 
what has not, and identify what mix of carrot and stick works best. We must 
identify those positive practices that have the potential to be scaled up and 
replicated, and we must review the full panoply of tools that will make stronger 
accountability something welcomed by all countries, independent of their level 
of development or of their contribution to economic growth or environmental 
destruction.
If we fail to do this—and do it now, in the design phase—there is a real chance 
that the green economy will turn out to be just another ride on the global merry-
go-round of broken promises and lost opportunities.
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International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
2  Najam, A. and M. Halle. 2010. Global Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Accountability. Sustainable 
Development Insights, No. 5. Boston University: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range 
Future.
3  Serra, N. and J. E. Stiglitz. 2008. The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
4  Fukuyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press.
5  Halle, M. and R. Meléndez-Ortiz. 2007. The Case for a Positive Southern Agenda on Trade and Environment, 
Chapter 2 in Envisioning a Sustainable Development Agenda for Trade and Environment, A. Najam, M. Halle, and R. 
Meléndez-Ortiz (eds). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
6  Najam, A., D. Runnalls, and M. Halle. 2007. 
7  Halle, M. 2002. Sustainable Development Cools Off. IISD Commentary. Winnipeg, Canada: International Insti-
tute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
8  Najam, A. and M. Halle. 2010. 
9  Najam, A., M. Papa, and N. Taiyab. 2006. Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda. Winnipeg, 
Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
10  Najam, A. and M. Halle. 2010.
Beyond Rio+20: Governance for a Green Economy     25
3.  development Governance and the Green economy:  
a Matter of life and death?
by Tom Bigg
“The real science of political economy, which has yet to be distinguished 
from the bastard science, as medicine from witchcraft, and astronomy 
from astrology, is that which teaches nations to desire and labour for the 
things that lead to life; and which teaches them to scorn and destroy the 
things that lead to destruction.” 
John Ruskin  
Unto This Last, 1860 
The governance of development encompasses the range of institutions, systems, 
processes, and decisions that affect the well-being and prospects of poor people 
and countries. This goes far beyond the bodies directly charged with responsi-
bility for achieving agreed development objectives; it includes the impacts of 
trade agreements and instruments; the exercise of power and rights at local and 
national levels; access to and use of natural resources and land; the functioning 
of markets; and a whole range of other factors that affect prospects for improve-
ments to the well-being of individuals and nations. 
The “green economy” is a similarly broad concept; it belongs at the centre 
of national and global debates about how we could and should organize our 
economies and lives differently if we are to achieve environmental sustain-
ability, social justice, and a viable and stable economy in the longer term. At 
present there is a risk that the notion of a ”green economy” will be discredited; 
its political currency means that it is increasingly associated with short-term, 
incremental tweaks to the mainstream and with the search for comparative 
advantage, not with challenges to the underlying drivers of change in our 
economies and societies.
Ruskin’s challenge is highly relevant here: how can the world move toward “life” 
and away from “destruction”? Can we establish a vision of the world we want to 
live in 30 or 40 years ahead, and then track a path by which we can get there? 
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Although the challenge for this essay was to scope out what development gov-
ernance should look like by the middle of the 21st century, a look backwards is 
also needed. What visions of the future and the means by which to realize them 
were set out 40 years ago, when the year 2000 was a distant prospect? What 
has been the experience of acting on and augmenting those visions during the 
intervening decades? What conclusions can we draw about the successes and 
failures, about what’s improving and what isn’t, about what is no longer seen 
as significant? What have emerged as major challenges over that period? And 
finally, can we prioritize areas for action now that will move the world in the 
right direction and lead to life?
PlanninG For the Future in the 1970s
Forty years ago the world was a very different place. Many of the changes since 
would have been unimaginable, and the unpredictability of subsequent events, 
inventions, social change, and discoveries all color our reading of prognoses 
from the 1970s and ‘80s. However, three factors are particularly striking in the 
most prominent future casting from that period and are explored below. 
Let’s take two examples: the report produced for the 1972 Stockholm Confer-
ence on the Human Environment Only One Earth (by Barbara Ward and René 
Dubos) and the much-maligned 1972 Club of Rome report Limits to Growth (by 
Donella Meadows et al.). Both were officially sanctioned and closely linked with 
inter-governmental bodies. Both looked at the impacts of resource scarcity and 
growing human impacts on the planet—in other words, at development chal-
lenges and the capacity of markets and states to meet growing human needs. 
Both presented projections for key variables up to the year 2000. Both set out 
a vision of how the world should be in the future and the steps needed to get 
there. Looking back, how should we rate their accuracy and what lessons can we 
learn from them?
First, they offered an impressive level of accuracy in the predictions made for 
global change over the past 30 years or so. Only One Earth predicted that the 
global population would reach 6.5 billion by 2000, with the urban population 
overtaking the rural one around the end of the century—both within a few years 
of the truth. While world energy consumption was actually about 30 percent 
below the projection for 2000, the authors estimated that average global tem-
peratures could rise by 0.5oC by 2000 as a result of human activity. Predictions in 
Limits to Growth were also surprisingly accurate: for 2008, world population was 
projected at 6.7 billion (actual figure 6.9 billion), and per capita industrial output 
Beyond Rio+20: Governance for a Green Economy     27
was estimated at 1.8 times 1970 levels (actual figure 1.9 times). Projections for 
birth and death rates globally, however, were rather less on the mark.1
Hall and Day, in their work “Revisiting the Limits to Growth After Peak Oil,” 
conclude that “there is growing evidence that the original ‘Cassandras’ were right 
on the mark in their general assessment, if not always in the details or exact tim-
ing, about the dangers of the continued growth of human population and their 
increasing levels of consumption in a world increasingly approaching very real 
material constraints.”2
Second, the key drivers of change and the dilemmas to be addressed identified 
in the two reports remain largely in place. To pick just two of many examples, 
Ward and Dubos explored the tensions between environmental concerns and 
development objectives, and the corrosive distrust that could derail global 
action.3 Meadows et al. argued that, as natural resources are placed under grow-
ing strain and limits are reached, increasing amounts of capital and manpower 
will have to be diverted to cope with these constraints, leading eventually to 
declines in quality of life. Both of these points are at least as relevant today as 
when they were written, along with numerous other analyses of the power 
dynamics and barriers to progress underlying the two publications. The purpose 
here is not to point out how prescient these authors were (though this is certainly 
true) but to highlight the intractable, continuing nature of the drivers of unsus-
tainable, inequitable development they identified. Presenting a strong analysis 
and a rational argument for change—appealing to the rational and enlightened to 
act—is not in itself sufficient. 
Third, the recommendations for action to deal with these challenges are ambi-
tious, logical, and compelling, and are still relevant because they have not been 
adequately addressed in the intervening years. Addressing the potential impacts 
of climate change, Only One Earth argues for “a new capacity for global decision-
making and global care. [Man’s global interdependence] requires coordinating 
powers for monitoring and research. It means new conventions to draw up 
ground rules to control emissions from aircraft… It requires a new commitment 
to global responsibilities.” Looking back in 2004, the authors of Limits to Growth 
conclude: “We are much more pessimistic about the global future than we were 
in 1972. It is a sad fact that humanity has largely squandered the past 30 years 
in futile debates and well-intentioned, but half-hearted, responses to the global 
ecological challenge.”4 
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We can draw some broad conclusions from this short and partial summary. We 
already have the information, the projections into the future, the intellectual 
arguments, and the practical tools for action needed to deliver effective and fair 
development in conjunction with better stewardship of natural resources and 
systems to safeguard the planet for future generations, using the wealth of data 
and analysis generated over the past 40 years. While further assessments and 
reports are useful in sustaining awareness of key trends and potential tipping 
points, they do not in themselves offer the ”magic bullet” that will shift the 
mainstream. 
However, appeals to enlightened self-interest and the need for global action 
have very limited traction, and the growing influence of countries that have no 
desire to cede power to international agencies or give up elements of sovereignty 
means any supra-national framework for action is a long shot for the foreseeable 
future. While we already have a composite long-term vision of where the world 
should be going, we lack clarity on the immediate, incremental steps that can 
get us there. Furthermore, although states have made commitments to address 
environmental challenges and tackle poverty and the lack of access to basic 
resources, progress is partial—and there is little evidence of positive change in 
the poorest countries. 
The reality is that moves toward a more sustainable and fairer world are up 
against some tough constraints: the interests of powerful constituencies that 
defend their turf and can manipulate the political system to stymie change; the 
hierarchy of policy and politics in almost every country which places environ-
mental issues towards the bottom and economic growth and military security 
at the top; and the difficulty of achieving strong global regimes to effect change 
at a time when multilateralism is on the retreat. The most pressing challenge is 
to develop the tactics and tools for incremental change in critical areas that can 
start to move our societies and economies in the right direction.
What’s diFFerent about the “Green eConoMy”?
There are two principal ways in which the green economy concept offers the 
potential to move beyond the stalemate that has mired most international nego-
tiations on sustainable development over the past decade or so.
Green economy is a term used by new and surprising sets of actors. Incorpora-
tion of “green stimulus” elements in the financial recovery packages in 2008–09 
was not driven by an environmental lobby, but by economic calculations of 
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the potential for job creation and economic resilience. Within many countries, 
anticipated scarcity in access to fossil fuels and “rare earth” minerals (to pick 
just two examples) are driving policy and technological efforts to shape alterna-
tive futures. Private sector actors are anticipating major shifts in markets and 
resource availability, and planning for much lower carbon intensity production 
as a result. In short, the economics of scarcity and uncertainty are stimulating 
significant efforts to develop alternative, “greener” business models and patterns.
Poor countries have much to gain from a focus on the green economy. While 
environmental assets provide just two percent of total wealth in the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, they 
provide around 26 percent of wealth in the poorest countries.5 Within develop-
ing countries, the figures are even more striking. While seven percent of India’s 
GDP is directly attributable to 
services from ecological sys-
tems, the poorest tenth of the 
population derives 57 percent 
of its gross domestic product 
from ecosystem services, 
through small-scale or infor-
mal economic activities such 
as farming, animal husbandry, 
informal forestry, and fisheries. Furthermore, rapidly emerging economies have 
the potential to expand energy provision and plan for urban growth without 
having to undo the legacy of a century or more of outmoded infrastructure and 
associated patterns of social behavior.
So far so good. The potential for major change seems more real than at any time 
since the early 1970s. However, this does little to address the need for greater 
fairness in the distribution of resources and opportunity, and the structures of 
governance that can make these a reality. In periods of rapid change and uncer-
tainty, the likelihood is that the rich and powerful will draw away from those at 
the other end of the scale rather than act in solidarity. And as noted above, there 
is little sign that supranational institutions and commitments will strengthen 
over the coming decades. What compelling vision, then, can we articulate that 
links global equity inextricably with a new green economy? What institutions, 
instruments, and levers of influence might be needed at global level to make a 
greener economy also a fairer one? 
Poor countries have much to gain from a 
focus on the green economy. While environ-
mental assets provide just two percent of 
total wealth in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, they provide around 26 percent 
of wealth in the poorest countries.
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the vision
As Willy Brandt stated in the Brandt Commission, “A new century nears, and with 
it the prospects of a new civilization. Could we not begin to lay the basis for that 
new community with reasonable relations among all people and nations, and to 
build a world in which sharing, justice, freedom and peace might prevail?”6 
The vision that we have carried since the early 1970s, and most fully articulated 
in Our Common Future, is of an economy that produces a range of social and 
environmental, as well as economic, benefits for individuals, communities, 
and society overall. It is a vision of environmental governance that restores and 
protects the resilience of ecosystems and the biodiversity within them, and thus 
secures the many services they provide. It is a vision of development that uses 
natural resources sustainably, allocating environmental benefits and costs fairly 
to achieve a more just and equitable society. 
What are the key characteristics of an effective governance system at an interna-
tional level that can help deliver these assets around the world? I propose three 
major elements that could usefully inform the incremental progress we should 
aim for over the coming three to four decades. First, a shift from development 
aid to payments for public goods; second, a leveling of the playing field so that 
environmentally sound and socially just practice is rewarded across the spec-
trum; and third, active support for local diversity and accountability as critical 
factors in building economic resilience. 
First, there must be socially just payments for public goods. We can already 
see the rapid emergence of a system intended to increase global capacity to 
address the impacts of climate change, and to help secure the benefits of a stable 
and functioning climate system for the planet. This already demonstrates the 
potential for money and other forms of support to be transferred that dwarfs 
the aid budget (notwithstanding huge flaws in governance and lack of vision). It 
seems highly unlikely, given current trends and political pressures, that “official 
development assistance” in its current form will still exist by 2050. In its place, 
and at much more ambitious levels, we could be in a position where a range 
of public goods are funded through instruments that act as a tax on “bads” and 
reward “goods.” Countries should be enabled to shift from reliance on aid to 
receiving payment for services that safeguard significant resources. As develop-
ment experts Keith Bezanson and Francisco Sagasti put it, development is not so 
much a problem to be solved as a condition from which to evolve. 
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Crucial to the success of this transformation would be to avoid creation of some 
gargantuan bureaucracy while still facilitating the effective transfer of funds and 
other resources (know-how, innovations, etc.) through a diversity of channels. An 
inter-governmental governance framework is necessary to provide oversight and 
legitimacy, but not to dominate the activities. A second crucial factor is to recog-
nize and respond to demand for support. Development to date has been over-
whelmingly supply-driven; a future alternative should recognize local specificity 
and particular contexts in which positive change is possible and find ways to 
support these effectively. The implications of this shift are huge—and there’s no 
space to explore them further here. However, one significant implication should 
be the strengthening of local and national systems of accountability.
Second, it is time to level the playing field. It is quite clear that there are signifi-
cant barriers to moving towards a greener global economy and society that are 
built into the fabric of our world. Our system of shareholder value imposes a 
terrifyingly short time horizon on all publicly listed companies. Our economic 
models and accounting systems exclude environmental costs and assets from 
calculations, which means these still have little value in financial terms. As 
above, international development governance is not best placed to oversee and 
“manage” each of these areas; what we need is the capacity to assess where 
prevailing rules and instruments are reinforcing unsustainable practice and the 
means to challenge them. 
This kind of approach will only be effective if it demonstrates three character-
istics. The first of these is the capacity to prioritize: There are a multitude of 
things wrong with the way the world functions that have a negligible impact on 
critical sustainability factors, and a limited number that have a seismic global 
effect. It will be essential to identify the most important international governance 
changes that are needed and present a clear and compelling case for change. 
The second characteristic is subsidiarity: Only issues that cannot be resolved at 
lower levels of governance should be tackled at global level. The third attribute 
needed is power, or agency: As we have seen earlier, being able to identify prob-
lems and propose solutions is of little value if the perpetrators are able to ignore 
the prognosis and calls for change. 
This is, of course, a long way from the realities we face today, and it is hard to 
see how we could arrive at a governance regime able to achieve this level of 
influence. However, an effective and coherent global system would require this 
capacity to identify and change existing drivers of change.
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Third, local diversity and accountability must be supported. Most of the critical 
factors in determining whether the “green economy” becomes a reality will be 
played out at local and national levels. The governance and planning of urban 
centers will be (and already are) crucial in determining future patterns of energy 
use, employment, consumption of natural resources, rewards for livelihoods, 
and so on. Opportunities to 
create ”green jobs” depend 
less on international factors 
than on local characteristics 
(e.g., the availability of skilled 
labor; regulations and incen-
tives put in place by local and national governments; investment options; com-
parative advantage through location, natural resources, etc.). Accountability for 
decisions taken and policy coherence is most needed at the local level to ensure 
that the progress made in meeting social and environmental needs at one level 
is not wiped out through conflicting measures or actions at another level. 
All of this takes place outside the purview of international governance. Where 
there is a key role for some form of global action is in legitimizing such activ-
ity where useful, in making connections between different contexts to enable 
learning and collaboration, and in addressing trans-national factors that impede 
progress at lower levels of governance.
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Most of the critical factors in determining 
whether the “green economy” becomes 
a reality will be played out at local and 
national levels.
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4. Governance of international trade for  
the Green economy
by Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz*
“If a term has many diverging definitions, it is better to begin by assuming 
that it is full of meanings. For none of the main ideas of our civilization 
has a single meaning.”
Walter Lippmann,  
Essays in the Public Philosophy (1955)
on eConoMiCs and sustainability
In its simplest formulation, the “green economy” refers to economics in the name of 
sustainability: a system of interactions among markets, environmental forces, and 
social policies that supports human subsistence and freedoms over generations.
Sustainability broadens the study of economics, moving it beyond the assump-
tion that utility sufficiently explains individual behavior and that certain “natu-
ral” laws govern market exchanges. It calls for a reformulation of economics in 
the direction proposed by Amartya Sen, bringing together modern economics 
and the foundations of the moral philosophy of welfarism, thus welding eco-
nomics to the natural resource realities of today, the rapidly integrating global 
market, and the blinding pace of technological innovation supporting it. 
If economics intends to “understand, explain and predict human behavior” to 
inform “prognosis and policy” in the service of sustainability, tinkering with con-
cepts of classical economic thought may not give us all the tools that we now need.1 
Sustainable development requires that economic actors be guided by an Aristote-
lian “god-like” aim, not by the “good of man.” In Adam Smith’s words, good citizens 
promote the “welfare of the whole society.”2 Today, in the context of sustainable 
development, such aims refer to an inter-generational imperative as well. 
We need to ensure that institutional arrangements and decisions do not hurt 
our ability for maintaining or improving future living standards. Moreover, by 
capturing the negative externalities of our natural resource use, our economic 
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institutions and systems should be managed so that we can live off the dividends 
instead. We need to distinguish “between survivability, which requires welfare 
to be above a threshold in all periods, and sustainability which requires welfare 
to be non-decreasing in all time periods.”3 We need to provide incentives that 
protect rainforests rather than turn them into charcoal. 
We are currently transitioning from a world of plenty into one in which the 
 planet’s resources have been compromised in their ability to sustain our routines. 
We are also in a world of global economic and social multi-level governance. 
From the perspective of the trade system of today, how can we get to sustainabil-
ity? And what is the role of institutions in the creation of a green economy?
the GovernanCe Web
Trade and sustainable development hinge on institutions. In the absence of a formal 
worldwide authority, governments need to ensure that domestic and international 
institutions interact constructively to pursue sustainable development goals and not 
work at cross-purposes. Several crucial sustainable development policies will have 
ramifications for commercial exchange. Shaping and managing this intersection is 
the governance challenge. While national governments can establish sustainability 
directives for ministries, this is not an option available at the multilateral level. 
Global “governance,” rather than “government,” recognizes a system that operates 
under formal and informal rules and practices arising from multiple sources, and in 
which efforts are accountable to multiple stakeholders.4 Getting these rules to rein-
force each other and work together coherently is critical. To do this, governments 
will need to work innovatively within and across institutions.
The challenges are manifold. Population growth is concentrated in the poor-
est countries, where meeting basic human development needs and aspirations 
entails increased resource use. Increasing wealth in the developing world—a 
good thing—involves changing diets and boosting demand for resource-intensive 
food, which puts more pressure on nature and energy systems. Climate change 
impacts are complicating the picture even more. 
New policies governing investment, finance, energy, and knowledge are neces-
sary to harness economic activity into modes of production that favour resource 
conservation. However, the current trading system—which encompasses the 
multilateral rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) together with the 
growing landscape of bilateral and regional trade agreements—is not yet fully 
equipped to steer economic activity towards new pathways.
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Let us have no illusions about the trading system’s capacity to play a driving 
role. Most of the decisions necessary to set the planet on a course to sustainabil-
ity will not be made within the trading system, but virtually all such policy deci-
sions—from the internalization of environmental costs to policies that encour-
age innovation—will impinge on trade: what we produce, where we produce it, 
and how we exchange it. Some policy will overlap with issues now dealt with 
by international trade rules, such as intellectual property, standards, and protec-
tions for foreign investors. There are ample opportunities for policy-makers and 
influencers to ensure that trade-related policies do not detract from the pursuit 
of sustainable development.5 
At the same time, the trading system must remain true to its own principles and 
not allow environmental policy to become a pretext for governments to engage 
in discriminatory practices or pander to influential domestic economic actors. 
Trade and investment policies determine allocation and use of resources, from 
minerals and labor to knowledge and soil. Individual societies’ abilities to govern 
domestic resources are affected by the international regulatory systems for trade 
and investment—systems that they, in turn, can influence.
The idea is simple enough, but governments have a record of taking with one 
hand what they have given with the other. By conflating development policy 
with development aid, they have too often ignored the developmental effects of 
their trade, investment, immigration, and environmental policies. The classic 
example is levying high tariffs on goods exported by aid recipients. A more 
complex narrative comes from the incoherence of governments’ pursuit of a 
fundamental global developmental goal: food security, which has been an inter-
national policy objective for decades. Yet, nearly one human in six still does not 
get enough food to lead a healthy and active life. 
One problem linked to trade governance is well known: Rich country farm 
subsidies and tariffs push down prices and weaken incentives for developing 
country governments, or the private sector, to invest in agricultural production 
and build roads and the other rural infrastructure necessary to support it. The 
Uruguay Round trade talks, which brought agricultural tariffs and subsidies into 
the scope of multilateral trade rules, failed to correct these practices. Decades of 
low productivity and low farm prices pushed many small farmers in developing 
countries to look for other sources of income. In the process, they became net 
buyers of food. When food prices rose in 2007–08, many developing coun-
try farmers got caught in the middle. Correcting these problems requires an 
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evidence-based approach that allows countries to rise above commercial and 
mercantilist interests and conclude the WTO’s Doha Round. Coherent, coopera-
tive action on land-use across the governance board—whether on forests, water, 
biodiversity or climate—is another urgent need that must be addressed.
but…
It is not possible to look at trade governance processes in isolation from broader 
governance challenges. Modern international institutions must operate in circum-
stances they have never had to confront before: an increasingly multi-polar world. 
No single actor can impose its will on others. Moreover, the worst financial and 
economic crisis in decades has devastated some of our core assumptions about 
the global economy. As a result, major powers now disagree on fundamental 
aspects of how economies should be organized. Concordant beliefs and expecta-
tions are necessary to motivate action and change in international regimes. 
Even though “policy coherence” is a phrase used too much and followed too 
little, it is a concept to which we must return as we begin talking of building a 
“green economy.” Our collective failure to produce global public goods, such as 
updated multilateral trade rules that respond better to poor countries’ needs or 
curb greenhouse gas emissions, has been due at least in part to an inadequacy 
of what has been called “cosmopolitics”—“global political action transcending a 
strict state-to-state, or multilateral, basis.”6 
doinG With What We have—inCreMentally
The rules and practices embodied in the multilateral trading system offer 
governments ample potential to take action on current and future challenges 
linked to sustainable development—it’s just that governments have not purpose-
fully taken advantage of them yet.7 Making trade governance more supportive 
of sustainable development will require governments to change their behavior. 
Networks that bring together civil society, business, international organizations, 
and governments have done sterling work on several challenges, from public 
health to environmental protection and corruption. But trade institutions largely 
remain an enterprise between governments.
Moreover, the “legislative” or rule-making function of the WTO and other trade 
institutions is likely to remain limited to government participation only. Outside 
input into their “ideational” function—identifying which issues to discuss, and 
potential solutions—is desirable, especially from non-traditional sources (i.e., 
those other than business). But here too, governments will play a central role. 
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Even if a “trisectoral network” analogous to the World Commission on Dams 
was created to bring governments, business, and civil society together to think 
through the challenges of making the trade system contribute positively to a 
green economy, any recommendations would have trouble being heard at the 
WTO unless the initiatives received member governments’ blessing.  
To make sense of a chaotic and disorderly system, the hundreds of preferen-
tial trade arrangements of various types and coverage is a good place to start. 
The WTO has failed miserably to bring consistent rules here. A continuing 
black mark for the trading 
system is the vastly uneven 
capabilities among govern-
ments to assess their own 
needs and grasp the implica-
tions for global challenges of 
the complex web of arrange-
ments. And the development of such preferential agreements in a closed, 
competitive approach results in a fragmentation of markets at various levels. 
One proposal, a review by a Global Task Force of Ministers, may help mini-
mize inefficiencies and complexities inherent in the current system. This may 
lower the bar of meaningful participation from Olympian heights and make 
coherence more plausible. 
On this same path, countries need to update trade rules that are not working 
for sustainable development. The de facto differentiation among developing 
countries that has emerged in the Doha Round negotiations could become 
a springboard for a bold experiment in giving nations more policy space to 
respond to risk, unsustainable situations, or vulnerabilities. Parties to bilateral 
trade agreements could alter investment provisions so that they are not used as a 
sword against legitimate health and environmental action. WTO members could 
act to anticipate potential challenges to trade governance that might arise from 
governments’ pursuit of sustainable development, enabling a nimble response. 
WTO members would do well to build on existing subsidy rules to identify and 
target government handouts that damage the environment; for example, govern-
ment procurement rules and standards on process and production methods or 
measures addressing carbon content could be developed following non-discrimi-
nation principles, ensuring prevention of disguised protectionism. 
A continuing black mark for the trading sys-
tem is the vastly uneven capabilities among 
governments to assess their own needs and 
grasp the implications for global challenges 
of the complex web of arrangements.
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In the past few years, countries have been able to provide expression in trade 
terms—through particular prescriptions for market access, for instance—to the 
intractable concepts of food security, sustainable livelihoods, and rural develop-
ment. They have done it in the context of Doha’s negotiations by recognizing 
and classifying the particularities of specific products in terms of agro-ecological 
conditions, nutritional intake, employment relevance, and a long list of indica-
tors that despite its hard reality would otherwise be unapparent to multilateral 
policymaking. While the possibilities are there, countries can only shift direction 
and rearrange objectives if driven by compelling vision and political leadership. 
broadeninG the systeM
Issue-specific cooperation outside trade-related institutions could amplify the 
contribution that trade governance could make to sustainable development. 
For instance, while continuing the slow process of reducing rich country farm 
subsidies inside the WTO, governments collaborating in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) could agree to a tax on farm 
subsidies, with the proceeds directed at funding agricultural research and devel-
opment and extension services in developing countries.8 
Having to pay extra for the privilege of subsidizing would potentially make gov-
ernments think twice about lavish farm programs and their international conse-
quences. Investing a share of subsidy money directly in boosting agricultural pro-
ductivity in developing countries would amplify the effects of the WTO’s subsidy 
reform process. A farm subsidy tax may be wishful thinking. But a different trade 
issue with direct ramifications for food security—including agricultural export 
bans—will be impossible to address without serious complementary policies. 
Sudden bans of farm exports are not good policy: Not only do they “starve your 
neighbor,” they discourage investment to boost future production.9 But export 
bans do make a lot of sense to a government faced with rioters demanding 
cheaper food. Similarly, growing rice in solar-powered greenhouses, fed by 
groundwater and cooled with seawater, seems preposterous from both a cost 
standpoint and an environmental one. But Djibouti started doing it when it felt 
that it could no longer trust world markets for its food supply.10
Action outside the WTO could enhance the sustainable development impacts of 
the Doha talks to liberalize trade in environmental goods and services. Research 
in renewable energies suggests that tariffs are just one in many factors determin-
ing whether companies choose to invest in green technology.11 Other policies, 
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such as “feed-in tariffs” guaranteeing a price for renewable electricity, subsidies 
for components, and the use of renewable energy tax breaks, matter at least as 
much. If a group of governments got together and cooperated on these other fac-
tors—for instance, by harmonizing standards or making them interoperable, and 
establishing incentives for the sharing of trade secrets linked to green technol-
ogy—it would substantially expand the market for environmental goods. 
Similar institutional subsidiarity action is called for in the case of regulation of use 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, a key aspect of building incentives 
for the protection of biodiversity. Governments could act at the WTO to amend the 
intellectual property agreement, which provides the global baseline for patent rules, 
to include a genetic resources disclosure requirement for patent applicants. The 
Convention on Biological Diversity could finalize a protocol spelling out the rules 
guiding access to those genetic resources, as well as the sharing of benefits that arise 
from them. The World Intellectual Property Organization could develop an instru-
ment to protect folklore and traditional cultural expressions, while also serving as a 
repository for best practices on the protection of genetic resources.
More immediately, consistency in financing responses becomes urgent as the 
international community comes to grips with wants of developing economies 
in the face of emerging challenges. Today, an Aid-for-Trade (A4T) initiative has 
been established at the WTO involving major international financial institu-
tions. Within two to three years of implementation, resources at a magnitude 
of approximately $5 billion per year were flowing. In 2006–2007, total new 
commitments from bilateral, multilateral donors and others had reached over 
$50 billion.12 At the same time, the Kyoto Protocol unleashed climate mitiga-
tion funding for developing countries. Commitments under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the December 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord have lined up $30 billion for immediate release in 2010–2012. This flow 
of funds is expected to ramp up to $100 billion per year by 2020 to attend to the 
adaptation and mitigation requirements of developing countries. 
In moving towards a green economy, A4T and climate financing may be address-
ing similar and synergetic objectives: from specific analytical and policy capabili-
ties, to shifts in production, material needs, and challenges to competitiveness. 
Operational realities will dictate the obligation of addressing trade and climate 
financing in a coordinated manner. A sound understanding of needs, ways, 
and means to effect demonstrable change is still to be fully developed, as is an 
efficient and responsive governance scheme. Lessons learned in the financing 
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of climate change accords and the elaboration of national adaptation plans of 
action, as well as the World Bank’s endeavour to draw poverty reduction strategy 
papers as basis for development financing, should inform the push for coherence. 
Devising an institutional apparatus that brings together donors with recipient 
countries around the goal of coherence and coordination is a primary task in the 
governance of trade for the green economy. 
Final thouGhts on trade and the Green eConoMy
Today’s trade system may be incapable of steering the world into a “green econ-
omy.” It is, however, a wisely constructed governance device, with valuable prin-
ciples for the management of interaction among members at different levels of 
development. Yet it is a system informed by a theoretical perspective of econom-
ics and the homo economicus questionable from a sustainability perspective. 
In the absence of a review to 
complement it, tinkering with 
what we have may move us 
closer to shifting pathways, 
but only if societal concerns 
are introduced in an operative 
manner and responsive adaptations to the system are added in strategic steps. A 
firm political will, articulated in the form of a compact for shared vision agreed 
upon at Rio+20, may trigger reform and make it possible. 
Establishing a governance system for trade that supports the green economy 
would take time—whether ruinously too long is in our leaders hands. And time 
is the real test.
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5.  Consuming environments:  
options and Choices for 21st Century Citizens
by Stacy D. VanDeveer
Our world’s $70 trillion economy, with nearly seven billion humans in more 
than 190 independent countries, makes truly unprecedented demands of the 
earth’s resources. We grow, extract, produce, and trade vastly more than ever—
and we emit more wastes into the global environment than ever. Yet, it is not 
only the dramatic and growing ecological costs of our species’ massive use of 
resources that concern many activists, scholars, states, and firms around the 
world. As we make enormous and growing demands on the earth’s resources, 
we also make growing demands on each other and our political institutions.1
Crucially, “we” humans consume resources very unequally. The wealthiest one 
to two billion drive global consumption. Frankly, the earth cannot sustain the 
material throughput of seven to nine billion people in the coming decades, if all 
consume as many resources 
as the wealthiest billion do 
now. If we are to have a more 
equitable, more sustainable 
21st century, we must address 
the connections between eco-
logical degradation, human 
security, and consumption. 
If the green economy refers 
mainly to developing and deploying a few “cleaner” technologies and shopping 
for more eco-friendly products, the many developmental and environmental 
goals the international community has set for the next decades will not be met. 
We need states and international institutions that work, and markets that engen-
der sustainability rather than undermine it. And, we need to be citizens, rather 
than simply consumers and employees.
If the green economy refers mainly to 
developing and deploying a few “cleaner” 
technologies and shopping for more eco-
friendly products, the many developmental 
and environmental goals the international 
community has set for the next decades will 
not be met.
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resourCes, international PolitiCs, and realities
Humans have been fighting over resources, and cooperating with each other to 
trade, manage, and share them, throughout our history. Concerns about access 
to oil, uranium, and other critical resources were integral parts of planning and 
strategy in World War II, and they lurked beneath the global ideological struggles 
of the Cold War. The 21st century’s globalizing economic, political, and social 
processes have pushed the local and global politics of resources back into the 
top tier of issues in world politics. 
Traditionally, international politics scholars have focused analysis on state coop-
eration and/or conflict dynamics around issues of resource control and access. 
They have paid less attention to the growing material consumption in the global 
economy and to the inclination of global markets to push ecological damage and 
humanitarian degradation out of sight of consumers and their political representa-
tives. More analysis that connects international politics among states over access 
to natural resources with the causes and ramifications of accelerating resource 
consumption is needed. So is a deeper examination of attempts by states, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and firms  to curb the ecological and humani-
tarian abuses incumbent in contemporary global markets and consumption.  
The resource/commodities trade has long fueled and funded violence, abuse, 
and ecological destruction. Examples of this fact abound. Resources can be the 
subject of military conflict, or the means to raise the money that fuels weapons 
purchases or oppressive patronage networks and authoritarian governments. 
Resources are centrally important in politics among the world’s great military 
and economic powers, as well as the subject of politics and activism in local 
communities and within families. But to understand global resource politics, we 
start by accepting three facts and trying to think thoroughly about their connec-
tions and ramifications:
(1) Consumption uses things up; 
(2) The world is a very unequal place; 
(3) Scarcity can induce both human cooperation and conflict. 
Global ConsuMPtion in an unequal World
By now it is well known that we humans are consuming vast quantities of natu-
ral resources and changing our local, national, and global environments in the 
process. Furthermore, everything comes from somewhere. Whether the things we 
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consume are grown, captured, mined, or manufactured—or some combination of 
all of these—they come from somewhere. In the 21st century, these “somewheres” 
are often geographically and socially distant from most “consumers.” People and 
communities are involved in the complex international processes that create, 
finance, harvest, distribute, and sell the things we use in our daily lives. If we are to 
understand ever-expanding material throughput in our world (and global resource 
geopolitics), then we must remember that consumption happens at every stage 
or within every transaction along commodity and product chains.2 At every stage, 
with every interaction, things are used up. Every transaction along these chains or 
webs of economic and social relations consumes resources. 
The social and environmental conditions in which things are grown, harvested, 
and mined are often quite grim—in ecological and humanitarian terms—and 
often unregulated. Through complex commodity chains, the environmental and 
social implications of the things people consume are hidden or distanced from 
their everyday lives. Distancing of the implications of consumption severs feed-
back of information and ideas between socials groups involved in commodity 
chains. It obscures the costs (often called the ecological and human externalities) 
of our activities. In other words, the prices of goods do not reflect the costs—
environmental, social, human, or political—incurred in their growth, extraction, 
design, production, trade, use, and disposal.  
According to one recent estimate, humans consume about 50 percent more 
natural resources than they did 30 years ago, with people in wealthier coun-
tries consuming 5 to 10 times as many resources as those in poorer ones.3 The 
same study also notes that we have become more economically efficient over 
time, using 30 percent fewer resources to produce each dollar or euro of gross 
domestic product. North American consumerism begets a lifestyle associated 
with ravenous consumption of resources—energy, minerals, foods, and products 
of all types. We also know such consumptive patterns and institutions are being 
replicated around the world (mostly) by wealthy urbanites in many countries. For 
example, consumption of fossil fuels, beef, and bottled water continue to grow 
as the number of automobiles in the world passes one billion on its way to two 
billion and beyond.4 Such lifestyle choices globalize some of the most ecologi-
cally damaging and inefficient aspects of Northern consumer culture. Can this 
process continue? By 2005, Americans used 50 billion bottles of water in a coun-
try where tap water is safe to drink in almost every location.5 Can such trends 
be globalized without engendering more violent conflict and without massive 
ecological and humanitarian degradation?
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As global consumption grows, the world remains a very unequal place. About 
40 percent of the world’s 6.8 billion people live in poverty (defined by the World 
Bank as living on less than $2 per day). Almost one billion people live in even 
more desperate poverty—on less than $1 per day. In fact, about 80 percent of the 
global population lives on less than $10 per day—about what it costs to see a film 
or buy a couple of beers in much of the global North. More than 50  countries 
(more than a quarter of the total number) are actually poorer, per capita, than 
they were in the 1970s. Hundreds of millions have no access to clean water or 
medical care, regularly expe-
rience hunger and malnutri-
tion, and live with little or 
no hope of improvement in 
these conditions.6 These lives 
are nearly unimaginable for 
most North Americans and 
Europeans—and increasingly 
unknown to urbanites in 
booming cites around the globe. The world’s poor and lower income citizens do 
not drive growing global overconsumption or accelerate global competition for 
resources, nor do they drive global resource scarcities. 
Let us use carbon emissions as an example. While the average U.S. citizen emits 
almost 20 metric tons of carbon each year, the average European or Japanese 
citizen emits less than half of that, with similarly high standards of living. Chinese 
per capita emissions are about five metric tons, and average per capita emissions 
for India and most of Africa are less than two metric tons per year.7 So, while 
the African population grows much faster than that in North America, Europe, 
or China, it is not Africans whose consumption is rapidly changing the global 
climate. Nor is their consumption driving the global economy and its growing 
demands on the earth’s resources. Africans, however, will suffer the consequences 
of the global climate change they did not cause. Africa also plays host to many of 
the violent and ecologically damaging aspects of global resource trade and poli-
tics—and the world’s largest states and industries play key roles in these politics. 
Contemporary concern about consumptive and social justice aspects of “glo-
balization” has resulted in a host of state and non-state attempts to address the 
negative environmental and social conditions in producer communities around 
the globe. In recent years, scholars’ attention to consumption issues has grown, 
as the aggregate demand of our species continues to increase and as the environ-
As global consumption grows, the world 
remains a very unequal place. About 40 
percent of the world’s 6.8 billion people live 
in poverty (defined by the World Bank as 
living on less than $2 per day). Almost one 
billion people live in even more desperate 
poverty—on less than $1 per day.
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mental and human health implications of global resource consumption mount.8 
Environmental and social justice advocates have also turned their attention 
to combating overconsumption and to ecological and humanitarian costs of 
unregulated, or badly regulated, agricultural production, mining, and manufac-
turing around the world.9
Organizations such as Worldwatch Institute, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, WWF, 
Global Witness, Fair Trade International, and thousands of other NGOs are working 
tirelessly to reduce the environmental damage and human exploitation accompa-
nying the growth of global wealth and trade. Furthermore, some states are working 
together, and with international organizations, NGOs, and private sector organiza-
tions, to attempt to reduce corruption and improve governance in areas such as 
diamond mining and the oil and gas sector. Analysis of these diverse efforts yields 
insights about their origins, design, and effectiveness, contributing to our under-
standing about the evolving roles of public, private, and civil society actors.
non state-led aCtions, oPtions, and PoliCies
What can be done about the many environmental, security, and humanitarian 
issues raised here? What is already being done? What is working? What can we 
learn from innovative attempts to enhance sustainability occurring at different 
scales across the global North and South? Such questions and their answers 
must animate the analysis and debates in Rio and beyond. The good news is that 
there are a host of non-state-led and state-led efforts underway from which to 
draw lessons and build knowledge, and around which to enhance cooperation.
Hundreds of millions of people in the global North and South depend on com-
modities markets for their livelihoods, to say nothing of those who now reap 
the tremendous benefits modern societies and economies afford. A reasonable 
estimate is that nearly 150 million production workers (non-retail) and nearly 
500 million households depend on the production of basic commodities.10 This 
number does not include the millions more dependent on the production of 
thousands of finished goods. Even if it were possible for higher income societies 
and consumers to stop consuming commodities, throwing hundreds of millions 
of families out of work and leaving them without any means of support would 
not beget sustainable development either. Few want to return to Stone Age life-
styles or life spans. So, what can be done? 
Several sets of policy options currently pursued and/or suggested by ana-
lysts around the world are designed and championed by non-state actors in 
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civil society and/or the private sector. Some are designed to reduce aggre-
gate material throughput in consumer societies, while most are intended to 
address specific aspects of the ecological and humanitarian damage engen-
dered by the contemporary, globalizing political economy. Most may be 
deployed or experimented with at multiple levels of social organization, from 
local to global. Four overlapping types of initiatives have dominated recent 
practice and scholarly attention: 
• awareness raising and education,
• certification and labeling schemes,
• corporate social responsibility, and
• ethical consumption/purchasing movements and campaigns. 
Research has begun to assess the origins, operations, and evidence of impacts 
and effectiveness associated with these types of non-state led activism and 
governance. Prominent examples include certification and labeling associ-
ated with the Fair Trade movement and its thousands of products, the Forest 
Stewardship Council and the Kimberley process, the work of Transparency 
International to reduce corruption and improve governance, and the increas-
ing institutionalization of social responsibility and sustainability initiatives 
within many of the world’s largest corporations and industrial sectors. While 
these initiatives are not primarily led by state actors, public sector actors and 
institutions may still play important roles. So, for example, government bod-
ies may decide to purchase certified goods whenever possible, or to convene 
meetings and take other actions to engender corporate responsibility initia-
tives or disseminate their insights. In fact, many of these non-state-led initia-
tives are most active and influential where states function most effectively. In 
other words, non-state-led initiatives remain heavily reliant on and involved 
with states and the state system. 
state-led aCtions, oPtions, and PoliCies
State-led policy options are also proliferating and under analysis around the 
world. Some initiatives are (occasionally) designed to reduce aggregate material 
throughput in consumer societies or (more often) to address specific aspects of the 
ecological and humanitarian damage stemming from the contemporary, global-
izing political economy. All build on, and draw lessons from, existing and ongoing 
political action and institutions. Again, most of the options may be deployed or 
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experimented with at multiple levels of government, from local to global. Five 
overlapping types of initiatives currently receiving attention include the following:
• national regulations,
• effective international standards,
• adjustment of subsidies,
• tax externalities, and
• building governance capacities.
The growing analytical literature suggests that state action remains powerful, 
and sometimes uniquely essential, in contemporary politics and markets if 
environmental and social standards are to be raised. So, for example, if national 
and global energy efficiency is to be rapidly improved (thereby reducing energy 
consumption and polluting emissions), effective policies and regulations are 
often required. Furthermore, research in both wealthier and developing coun-
tries suggests that states can accomplish tasks and accrue advantages by enact-
ing such policies even when other states have not. So most states need not wait 
for global agreement on everything (or anything) to act. Reasonable national 
policies to reduce some types of consumption or increase efficiencies—such as 
carbon or energy taxes, product efficiency standards, or the reduction of ecologi-
cally damaging subsidies—can be effective absent global agreement about them. 
Some states can and do act unilaterally. Others act in groups. In some areas of 
energy and environmental policy, the European Union has demonstrated that 
setting and implementing the globe’s most stringent policies can in fact serve to 
advance (not limit) one’s economic and political interests.11  
States can also seek to work through existing or newly established interna-
tional organizations to set and implement standards and guidelines. These can 
be imbedded in global international law, such as within international trade or 
environmental agreements, or developed and promulgated by non-legally bind-
ing (or voluntary) initiatives such as those spearheaded by UN organizations. As 
other contributions to this report argue, transnational and inter-state coopera-
tion often require effective institutions and organizations. 
ProteCtinG or ConsuMinG eaCh other?
If global sustainable development is also about improving the lives of the world’s 
poorest and most marginalized, then addressing issues of overconsumption in 
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some societies cannot simply mean consigning others to perpetual, grinding 
poverty. The challenge of greater sustainability—political, economic, and social—
is to ensure or engender a high quality of life for all of the nearly seven billion 
people of today and the nine 
to 10 billion expected by mid-
century, without exceeding 
the capacity of our planet’s 
ecosystems. As the list of 
non-state-led and state-led 
initiatives outlined above 
illustrates, there is a grow-
ing menu of options facing 
domestic and international actors in the global North and the South. It also illus-
trates that changes must occur in the public, private, and civil society sectors—
changes that produce more effective and more sustainable states and markets.
In sum, we can ask whether people—citizens—want a global politics designed to 
protect humans and nature from exploitation, or a politics designed to facilitate 
consumption of things, people, and nature. Informed consumer purchasing deci-
sions may slightly reduce negative implications of some individual purchases, 
but they cannot substantially alter the foundational international economic and 
political dynamics. Ethical shopping therefore should not be expected to sub-
stantially reduce human and natural exploitation or the violence and oppression 
associated with resource markets on their own. When do people act as citizens, 
rather than as consumers? Similar questions can be asked of NGOs, firms, non-
state governance, and states. The options listed above—and many more—require 
engaged citizens at multiple levels of authority and across public, private, and 
civil society sectors, if the character and outcomes of global politics and markets 
are to be altered and transformed.   
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6.  Managing the Challenges of interlocking  resources
by Bernice Lee
Environmental change and resource constraints are adding to the complexity of 
international relations in an already turbulent world. The anticipated production 
bottlenecks—in food, water, energy, and the production of other critical natural 
resources and infrastructure—are bringing new geophysical, political, and eco-
nomic challenges, and creating new and hard-to-manage instabilities.1 They also 
have significant impacts on the global political economy, bringing new questions 
in respect to international law and the management of international regimes, as 
well as the distribution of resources.
Increasing globalization of supply chains—combined with higher incomes and 
population growth, in particular in the major developing countries—has seen 
both processing and consumption shift increasingly to developing countries. 
A study by Deloitte and the U.S. Council on Competitiveness points to a “new 
world order for manufacturing competitiveness” in less than a decade. Its Global 
Manufacturing Competitiveness Index highlights the rise in the manufacturing 
competitiveness of three countries in particular—China, India, and the Republic 
of Korea (Korea).2 The continued growth of manufacturing and consumption 
hubs around the world, in particular in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), is 
likely to lead to a consolidation and expansion of regional production networks. 
With this diffusion of demand and production centers, promotion of sustain-
able consumption—through the market power of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries’ consumers—will no longer be 
enough to drive change down supply chains in the coming decades.
It is now widely understood that astronomical demand growth from an emerging 
economy—driven by decades of industrialization and urbanization—is re-drawing the 
landscape for resources, from minerals, energy, and food to water. Water and land 
are likely to become increasingly important drivers of new investment decisions. 
Industry and power generation will feel the effects of water stress, most directly 
in the hydropower sector but also in nuclear and thermal power stations reliant 
on water coolant systems and in a wide range of manufacturing industries. There 
54   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  March 2011
has also been renewed interest in issues relating to resource security, the environ-
ment, and political change. Neo-Malthusian concerns about over-consumption and 
resource scarcities are not new; they have been around—and growing—since the 
1960s, the most famous being the Club of Rome’s report titled The Limits to Growth.3 
The combined effect of this resources demand growth together with shifting wealth 
to emerging economies is yet to be thoroughly analyzed and translated into policy 
planning practices. Emerging Asian economies have doubled their share of global 
output in the past two decades, for example. By 2030, non-OECD member coun-
tries as a group could account for as much as 57 percent of global gross domestic 
product (GDP) on a purchasing-power parity basis.4 In 2010, China overtook Japan 
as the world’s second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP, even though its per 
capita GDP—at U.S. $3,678—is still one-tenth of Japan’s. The increasingly blurred 
dividing line between developed countries and the emerging economies is likely to 
create new and difficult dynamics for the governance of the new green economy.
As traditional OECD importing countries decline as consumers in relative terms, 
will their power as rule-setters in international markets and the global economy 
fall correspondingly? Will the increasing dominance of the newcomers change 
the business models and operational assumptions? Lessons can be drawn, for 
example, from the oil and gas markets—manifest not least by the International 
Energy Agency’s (IEA) moves to include China and India in its strategic supply 
mechanism.5 State-backed Asian resource investment strategies are changing the 
business environment for competitors in extractive industries and other infra-
structure investments in developing countries. The traditional consumer and 
producer blocs will be less able to influence oil prices over the mid to long term, 
for example—and that will increase volatility.6 
Societal responses to resource threats—potentially exacerbated by climate 
change impacts—will change the established patterns of relations between 
producers and consumers of energy, food, and other natural resources. In 
the transition to the global green economy, there will be winners and losers. 
Before new models of global governance of resources are developed or old ones 
adapted—each with different operational assumptions and a different mix of 
consumer–producer dynamics—perceptions of insecurity will likely encour-
age stronger long-term strategic investments by the most import-dependent 
countries across the sectors. Today, Asian countries already prioritize long-term 
bilateral resource supply deals for oil, gas, and coal, sealed with political and 
economic support. And the search for water is already one of the driving forces 
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in the recent wave of deals between some of the major emerging economies 
and Arab Gulf states to secure land for agricultural production overseas. 
As states and markets navigate their pathway towards delivering a global green 
economy, policy-makers and businesses must have a firm grasp of the challenges 
ahead in a resource-constrained world, including the possibility of a dramatic 
change of paradigm vis-à-vis resources access and use. This paper will explore 
three key dimensions that will pave the way for more responsible markets for a 
global green economy.
the seCurity iMPaCt oF a resourCes-Constrained World
Food, water, and other resources are already facing serious pressures, driven 
by demographic changes and shifting consumption patterns. Total consump-
tion on this scale would exceed the tolerance thresholds of ecosystems and 
resources, whether cropland, rangeland, fisheries, or usable water.7 Individuals 
in the middle and upper classes increased resource consumption by more than 
200 percent between 1960 and 2004.8 The impact of water scarcity is also likely 
to grow significantly in the future. By 2050, 75 percent of the global popula-
tion could face freshwater shortages.9 Climate change impacts are expected to 
exacerbate these pressures, although to what extent will depend upon the policy 
choices that are made in the coming years. 
These interlocking climate, resource, and development problems are increasingly 
understood as key accelerators to the range of risks and vulnerabilities policy- 
makers and citizens need to manage in the short, medium, and longer terms. 
Especially in the developing world, water availability, energy security, and the 
upward trend in costs for many resources together constitute significant new risks.
Despite increased recognition of the need to manage resource security and the poten-
tial political fallouts, these interlocking issues are rarely considered in a systematic 
fashion by governments and industries. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the con-
sequences of bad policy choices—and the cost of inaction and policy failures—should 
receive more attention. Policy planning runs the risk of preserving the prevailing 
assumptions and mindsets in terms of risk management, especially when dealing 
with complex issues with long-term time horizons and high scientific uncertainty. 
At the policy level, the implications of dangerous climate change for security and 
political stability are increasingly recognized by the foreign policy and defense 
communities. The Center for Naval Analysis report says climate change can 
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become “a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of 
the world…”10 In 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council completed a new 
classified assessment that explores how climate change could threaten U.S. secu-
rity in the next 20 years by causing political instability, mass movements of refu-
gees, terrorism, or conflicts over water and other resources in specific countries.11 
The Sydney Morning Herald reported in early 2009 that an assessment completed 
in 2007 by the Australian Defence Force concluded that climate change and rising 
sea levels posed one of the biggest threats to security in the Pacific; these impacts 
might also spark a global conflict over energy reserves under melting Arctic ice.12
Risk management involves the consideration of extremely disruptive events and the 
implications of policy failures and/or inaction. Most actors have yet fully to consider 
and factor into their short- and long-term strategies the political, economic, and 
security impacts of the worst-case scenarios, or of unlikely but highly consequen-
tial events triggered by climate, energy, food, and water crises (and the response 
mechanisms to them). Environmental change-induced migration, for example, 
could become yet another driver of future patterns of resource use. Forecasts for 
the number of people moving because of environmental degradation and climate 
change vary widely, ranging between 25 million and 1 billion, depending on which 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change scenarios occurs.13 
In the run-up to Rio+20, the international community can come together to com-
prehend the risks of business-as-usual planning and practices around resource 
access, use, and management. First, a range of worst-case scenarios could be 
developed to enhance understanding of potentially dangerous geo-political and 
economic impacts of policy failures in this area. Second, the upcoming high-level 
panel on resources could put forward a range of practical international mediation 
mechanisms to mitigate or manage future resource-related conflicts.
resourCes sCraMble For neW teChnoloGies? 
To move into a global green economy, new technologies are needed to meet a range 
of goals. Most of the discussions on technologies focus on economic viability and 
cost. However, moving to lower carbon options may not be a complete escape from 
the security of supply issue. This means that in addition to considering the economic 
viability of green options, we must also explore issues around material availability 
and the politics of resources access. For example, the needed transformation of the 
energy sector to meet climate and supply security concerns has been described 
as the “third industrial revolution.” Currently available technologies can deliver 
significant benefits, especially those relating to energy demand. But many new green 
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technologies and materials will need to be either developed or scaled up in the com-
ing decades, like renewable energy. In 2008, nearly one quarter of all investment in 
new generation was in renewable energy (excluding large hydropower)—a fourfold 
increase since 2003. These green technologies may require the use of a range of 
materials in significantly greater volumes, as seen in Table 1 and Table 2. 
table 1: Material use of new energy sources
Source: Materials Innovation Institute, November 200914
table 2: Material use of other environmental technologies
Source: Materials Innovation Institute, November 2009
Table 1: Material Use of New Energy Sources 
Problem  Solutions  Raw materials (application) 
Future energy 
supply 
 
Fuel cells 
 
Platinum 
Palladium 
Rare earth metals 
Cobalt 
  Hybrid cars  Samarium (permanent magnets) 
Neodymium (high performance magnets) 
Silver (advanced electromotor generator) 
Platinum group metals (catalysts) 
  Alternative energies  Silicon (solar cells) 
Gallium (solar cells) 
Silver (solar cells, energy collection/ 
transmission, high performance mirrors) 
Gold (high performance minors) 
  Energy storage  Lithium (rechargeable batteries) 
Zinc (rechargeable batteries) 
Tantalum (rechargeable batteries) 
Cobalt (rechargeable batteries) 
 Source: Materials Innovation Institute, November 2009
16 
Table 2: Material use of other environmental technologies 
Energy 
conservation 
Advanced cooling technologies  Rare earth metals 
  New illuminants  Flare earth metals (LED. LCD. OLED); Indium 
(LED. LCD. OLED); Gallium (LED. LCD. OLED) 
  Energy‐saving tires  Industrial minerals 
  Super alloys (high efficiency jet engines)  Rhenium 
Environmental 
protection 
Emissions prevention  Platinum group metals 
  Emissions purification  Silver; Rare earth metals 
High precision 
machines 
Nanotechnology  Silver; Rare earth metals 
IT limitations  Miniaturization  Tantalum (MicroLab solutions); Ruthenium 
(MicroLab solutions) 
  New IT solutions  Indium (processors); Tungsten (high 
performance steel hardware) 
  RFID (hand‐held consumer electronics)  Indium; Rare earth metals; Silver 
So :  aterials Innovation Institute, Nov mber 200917 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The development of new energy resources—as with the current options that they 
seek to replace—comes with new material and resource risks. These must be 
considered in risk assessment of new technologies. The predicted availability 
and price of a material will be an important consideration in the development of 
a particular design of a technology and will ultimately determine a technology’s 
viability, as will its environmental and resource-use implications. 
Let’s take the example of rare earth metals (REMs), a group of 17 elements 
whose unique properties make them indispensable in many advanced tech-
nologies, including clean energy.15 High growth rates are forecasted for many 
REMs. Those related to battery use, such as neodymium, are expected to grow 
at 10 to 16 percent between 2008 and 2012, while those used in the manufac-
turing of batteries may grow between 15 and 20 percent per year.16 The new, 
more efficient wind turbines, using rare earth permanent magnet generators, 
require approximately two tons of rare earth magnets per windmill. Currently, 
China produces 97 percent of the world’s rare earth supply, almost 100 percent 
of the associated metal production, and 80 percent of the rare earth magnets. 
Within the next 5 to 10 years, growth in China’s domestic consumption will 
leave no capacity for export. China recently imposed export restriction on a 
range of REMs, citing domestic use for economic development as a reason, 
which is creating tensions with the U.S. and the European Union.17
Increasing awareness over the need for REMs has already triggered rapid sup-
ply responses: from the re-birth of metals recycling in Kosaka, Japan to new 
plans to reopen or establish new rare earth mines in South Africa, Australia, 
Canada, the United States, Vietnam, etc.18 But trade tensions over access to 
REMs illustrate the type of conflict that may proliferate in a resources-constrained 
world. The increasing national control of resource governance, as in the oil 
sector in the recent past, has placed restrictions on the global trade of some 
materials with the associated impact on the material availability and/or price. 
While many of these factors may only affect the individual manufacturer at 
the current time, there are important considerations for policy-makers and the 
wider business community. 
Rio+20 provides an excellent opportunity for policy makers to come to grips 
with the resources and materials dimensions of new technologies, and to 
propose new public-private mechanisms in managing resources security for the 
green economy. This may involve a range of voluntary agreements to share criti-
cal resources in exchange for knowledge transfer. 
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MakinG Markets resPonsible For resourCes  
For the Green eConoMy
Addressing resource security questions would require generating multiple public 
goods from the same production systems or sectors. Unless incentives in interna-
tional markets are aligned towards both environmental and resource goals, even 
well-meaning initiatives and efforts will not necessarily deliver the public policy 
outcomes needed for the green economy. 
Environment and resource risk-related exposure of companies and governments 
will continue to come under increasing public scrutiny in the coming decades. 
Voluntary or mandatory reporting is increasingly common on carbon and is likely 
to extend to cover water, biodiversity and other environment-related factors. 
As awareness of resource and environmental stresses continues to rise, innova-
tion and investment in green goods and services is set to expand rapidly; com-
panies and governments that are moving fastest will gain significant competitive 
advantages. Water constraints, for example, will provide business opportunities 
through innovation in water-efficient technologies and practices. 
This race for green solutions is already evident in low-carbon sectors. It is also 
critical for policy-makers to reaffirm the key role of an open trading system 
in delivering cost-effective green goods and services. Markets for low-carbon 
energy products are likely to be worth at least $500 billion per year by 2050, 
and perhaps much more, according to the Stern Review. Listed companies in 
the climate change sector already surpassed the Stern estimates in 2008— 
reaching a global turnover of $534 billion. It also exceeds the $530 billion turn-
over of the aerospace and defense sector.19 HSBC recently forecasted that the 
low-carbon energy market will triple to $2.2 trillion by 2020.20
While shifting economic power may erode the strength of OECD consumers in 
greening the supply chain, interdependence in global supply chains means that 
the market power of green consumers can continue to be harnessed in driv-
ing sustainable business practices and innovations strategies. On the occasion 
of Rio+20, progressive governments, businesses, and civil society leaders can 
co-convene a High-Level Panel on Sustainable Supply Chains to put forward a 
transformative vision that takes into account environmental as well as equity 
concerns. This could include piloting a comparable set of criteria for labeling and 
other tools for specific products. 
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7.  Climate and energy
by Saleemul Huq
A future green economy needs to avoid dangerous global climate change 
and do so within the context of sustainable development. The main features 
of what the global energy 
system should look like 
under those circumstances 
are now generally agreed 
upon. Over the next two to 
three decades, the global 
energy mix—that is, the 
combination of energy 
sources powering our society—must be transformed from a system mostly 
dependent on fossil fuels to a portfolio that emits significantly less carbon. 
The transition, to be completed by 2050, needs to go through a low-carbon 
phase in the first two decades—we cannot wait until 2050 to make all the 
changes. These time constraints are based on the science of climate change, as 
assessed periodically by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
and particularly the estimates of global emission reductions need a chance 
to limit global temperature increases to less than two degrees Celsius; that is, 
reductions of 80 percent or more compared to 1990 emission levels.
With regard to the global governance of climate change (and hence energy) there 
is a well-established global treaty, namely the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed and ratified by practically 
all countries of the world in the early 1990s. Under the UNFCC, all countries have 
agreed to protect the global climate system on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.1 
They have recognized the potential dangers of global warming due to the continued 
emissions of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide (CO
2
) from burning of fossil 
fuels, but also other warming gases such as methane (CH
4
) and nitrous oxide (N
2
O). 
They have also agreed to take actions to reduce their emissions to prevent danger-
Over the next two to three decades, the 
global energy mix—that is, the combination 
of energy sources powering our society—
must be transformed from a system mostly 
dependent on fossil fuels to a portfolio that 
emits significantly less carbon. 
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ous climate change. Furthermore, according to the principle noted above, parties 
to the UNFCCC agreed that developed countries should take the lead in combating 
climate change.
The devil, as always, is in the details. For example, which countries need to act first, 
by how much, and at what rate?2 These questions remain fraught with geopoliti-
cal tensions, with the main divide occurring between the rich countries (named in 
Annex 1 of the UNFCCC) and the rest of the world (called the non-Annex 1 countries 
in climate change negotiations parlance).3 There are also some differences among 
developed countries, best illustrated by the divergences between the U.S. and the 
EU; and among developing countries, with BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and 
China) capturing, for example, most climate investment, leaving some of the poorer 
and most vulnerable countries feeling left out.  
This essay outlines a few ideas for possible ways to achieve that energy transi-
tion in governance and institutional terms and within the context of what we are 
now calling a “green economy.” These ideas are based on two decades of involve-
ment in and observation of the UNFCCC’s development and implementation, as 
well as debates regarding the failure to achieve the Convention’s stated goals of 
preventing some level of dangerous climate change.
FroM burden to oPPortunity
The failure of global institutions in dealing effectively with the climate change 
problem under the UNFCCC  (despite some limited successes such as the Kyoto 
Protocol) has been mainly due to the prevailing paradigm under which the 
weaning of national energy systems from fossil fuels towards cleaner (non-pollut-
ing) sources has been seen as a burden rather than an opportunity. The “costs” of 
mitigation are highlighted in nearly every policy document on mitigation.4 Yet, 
the (economic) opportunities of mitigation are seldom discussed. 
Thus the main arguments have been between the rich countries (mainly the U.S., 
which is the richest and biggest polluting country) and the developing world 
(primarily China, which has a fast-growing economy that has already made it the 
world’s biggest net emitter of greenhouse gases). This divide manifested itself in 
the spectacular failure of the Copenhagen Climate Summit in December 2009. 
Copenhagen was supposed to achieve the agreement that would become the 
successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. Instead it achieved nothing but a rather 
meaningless “Copenhagen Accord” with limited legal and doubtful moral value.5
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This failure stemmed from the reluctance of the two biggest emitters, namely 
the U.S. and China, to agree to meaningful reductions in their emissions. As long 
as they and others continue to see the short-term costs of reducing emissions as 
paramount to the longer-term benefits of avoiding dangerous climate change, 
there is little likelihood of achieving an ambitious global treaty. And definitely 
not the kind of post-2012 (when the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
expire) treaty that most people had hoped for in Copenhagen.
This situation can change once countries like China and India realize that a 
global temperature rise of over three degrees Celsius (which is where the world 
is currently headed) will cause very severe impacts to people, agriculture, and 
ecosystems in their own countries.6 With this realization, they are likely to also 
appreciate that by taking action to avoid such a fate (for example, by not tapping 
the vast coal reserves they are sitting on) they may also be hastening the transi-
tion to a low-carbon energy mix. Even if switching to a carbon-free energy mix 
might cost more in the short term, the transition is laden with future opportunity. 
There are already some signs (particularly in China) that they are beginning to 
realize this potential and are preparing to become the leaders of the upcoming 
post-fossil fuel world.
But the opportunities that exist in the post-fossil fuel world are not limited to 
only these very large economies. Indeed, if the world is to see a massive energy 
transition, it could create 
opportunities for all countries. 
While it is true that large 
uncertainties can loom within 
such a massive change, it is 
also true that large oppor-
tunities exist. Costs of wind 
and solar energy are already 
beginning to decrease, and these cost reductions are creating opportunities for 
energy production in countries that have hitherto been energy importers. 
Although their stance in global negotiations remains tentative, a number of large 
oil producers have also begun exploring opportunities in non-fossil fuel energy 
production. They know better than anyone else the benefits of being major 
energy producers, and if a transition is to be made they do not wish to stay out 
of whatever the new “green economy” will look like. A case in point is the tiny 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, which is also a major oil producer. Not only is Abu Dhabi 
Indeed, if the world is to see a massive en-
ergy transition, it could create opportunities 
for all countries. While it is true that large 
uncertainties can loom within such a mas-
sive change, it is also true that large oppor-
tunities also exist.
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boasting a massive effort towards creating a zero-emission city and embracing 
cutting-edge green technologies, it now also hosts the headquarters of the Inter-
national Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)—a signal to the world of its inter-
est in green energy, and to itself of where the future is headed. Indeed, the fact 
that there is now such an agency is itself an indicator of the recognition that an 
energy transition is now not only inevitable, but also that it must be institution-
ally managed if it is to be globally relevant.
the seCond and third billion are key
My second point stems from the fact that an overwhelming majority of the 
world’s past and current greenhouse gas emissions—if assigned to people by 
taking wealth (with associated high consumption and hence high emissions) 
into account—can be attributed to the richest one billion people (most of whom 
live in the rich world but with significant numbers also in the developing world). 
Making these one billion people change their high-consumption lifestyles will 
take either major behavioral changes (which is very unlikely in the short term) 
or drastic national policies to reduce fossil-fuel dependence (for which their 
governments have not shown any political willingness so far).
So perhaps we will be better off focusing not on this top one billion, but instead 
moving our institutional attention to the second (and third) billion richest people 
on the planet—a large proportion of whom are urban dwellers in the faster-
developing countries such as China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil. 
These two to three billion also aspire to the same high-consumption lifestyle, but 
they have yet to attain it. They may well be the real architects of a new “green 
economy” for the future. If they follow the path to lifestyles that include multiple 
cars, air conditioners, flying across the world, and diets high in meat, and if 
their energy needs are met by investments (which are largely still to be made 
over the next decade or two) in fossil-fuel systems, then we will be locked into a 
fossil-dependent future for a very long time. And that would mean any hopes of 
stabilizing stratospheric carbon would be doomed.7 
On the other hand, if these two or three billion could be provided with a good 
life and high development—a legitimate aspiration on their part—by investing in 
non-fossil fuel energy, then much of the future greenhouse gas emissions may 
be avoided and a real “green economy” enabled. This would need innovative 
thinking in terms of technologies as well as policies to allow these populations 
to leapfrog from relative poverty to improvements in quality of life without the 
associated high per capita carbon footprint of the richest billion.
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The global governance challenge is to create institutions that can unleash such 
innovative thinking. While most of our existing institutions are caught in think-
ing about mitigation and carbon management, what we need are institutions 
that can think in terms of the development requirements of those whose needs 
remain unmet today. That is, we need institutions that focus on this middle two 
to three billion and are concerned about triggering an energy transition that can 
meet the legitimate energy aspirations of this critical cohort.
the Most vulnerable May lead the Way
The main victims of the failure of the global leaders assembled in Copenhagen 
last December are the poorest people living in the poorest countries—mostly in 
Africa and Asia. They are the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of even a 
two-degree global temperature rise. The fact that the emissions of the poorest 
billion humans living in the poorest hundred countries account for less than five 
percent of global emissions only highlights the inequity and injustice involved in 
the climate change problem—namely, that the rich have caused the problem but 
the poor will suffer the consequences first and hardest.
Nevertheless, some of these poor and vulnerable countries (such as the Mal-
dives, Costa Rica, and Bangladesh) are leading the world in tackling climate 
change at home (both through adaptation as well as mitigation). The Maldives 
(whose emissions are miniscule) has decided to become carbon neutral in the 
next decade. This is not because their emissions are large or because they are 
being made to do it, but because it is the right thing to do. Moreover, they are 
sending a proactive signal to the rest of the world about what needs to—and can 
indeed—be done.
Thus the rest of the world may actually be able to learn lessons from some of 
the poorest countries on the planet when it comes to making the transition to 
a global green economy. Indeed, there is also a conceptual logic to this. Institu-
tionally, and in terms of the transition to sustainable development, the poorest 
countries are also the countries that are least locked into the fossil fuel economy, 
and therefore most able to change, and likely to do so at less cost. The problem, 
of course, is that precisely because of their poverty, even these lesser costs may 
be well beyond their means. This is where the argument for assertive global gov-
ernance comes in. Institutions of sustainable development should be investing 
in these countries to speed up the transition to cleaner energy, and should do so 
for development reasons much more than for climate reasons. Therein lies the 
“win-win.” Global governance investments in cleaner energy in poor countries 
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yield development benefits and should be both perceived and made as sustain-
able development investments.
ConClusions
A shift towards the green economy will require a transition of the energy system 
to deal with climate change, specifically making the energy system independent 
from fossil fuels at the global level. This shift will need to occur in the context of 
sustainable development when global governance institutions are shaped to view 
energy as a development issue but without devaluing its carbon implications. 
This article has offered three possible ideas towards this goal. 
First, countries need to recognize the opportunities imbedded in energy tran-
sitions. As long as climate change action is considered a “cost,” prospects for 
action will be dim. When climate action is considered instead as both cheaper 
than dealing with the consequences and an opportunity for leadership in the 
post-fossil fuel world, then there will be hope for action. 
Second, most of today’s emissions are by the richest billion people on Earth. 
But it is the second and third billion people, mostly in rapidly developing 
countries, who may hold the key to speeding up a transition. These are the 
populations for whom the new investments in energy are being made. How 
these investments are made will determine whether we are locked in a carbon-
intensive or a decarbonized world. 
Finally, we must not underestimate the role of the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries in the world. We think of them as the likely “victims” of global climate 
change, but they can also act as change agents. While their emissions may 
be globally negligible, their climate-change actions and policies may serve as 
example and inspiration to the rest of nations. More importantly, assisting them 
in their own energy transitions will create development benefits for them and 
could be a cost-effective means of triggering the larger global transition. 
All three ideas require a shift in the global governance of climate change to 
move away from its primarily carbon-based and principally mitigation focus 
to a more developmental focus. For this to happen, institutional arrangements 
are needed that will focus on sustainable development. It is only in the con-
text of sustainable development that a “green economy” can be conceived or 
 implemented.
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8.  transforming Global Forest Governance
by Hans Hoogeveen and Patrick Verkooijen
Since sustainable development entered the international agenda in the mid-
1980s, sustainable development governance has evolved rapidly. The gover-
nance system we have today reflects both the successes and failures of this 
process. There is growing awareness that the present system of development is 
rapidly and irreversibly eroding all three pillars of sustainable development: eco-
nomic, social, and environmental. The current governance’s high maintenance 
needs, internal redundancies, and inherent inefficiencies have combined to have 
the perverse effect of impeding the achievement of sustainable development 
worldwide.1 Against this background, we characterize global forest governance 
(GFG) as a subset of the broader sustainable development agenda. In this paper, 
we take as our point of analytical departure that GFG is not only a cornerstone 
of sustainable development, but that to understand the complexities, challenges, 
and nuances of GFG, it has to be placed within the evolving concept of sustain-
able development.
The GFG system we have today is one of mixed results.2 On one hand, there is 
a high awareness of threats to forests and numerous efforts have emerged to 
address them globally. Although sustainable forest management has been high on 
the international agenda since the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in 1992, although a “non legally binding instrument 
on sustainable management of all forests” was agreed upon, and although we 
spend many billions of dollars yearly on regional, national, and local programs 
for sustainable forest management, we are still not able to stop or reverse the 
loss of 13 million hectares of forests per year. So, ironically, not withstanding 
the rather spectacular growth in awareness and initiatives, the GFG system has 
outgrown its original design and intent in terms of addressing the problems and 
societal goals that led to its creation.3 We assert that global forest governance and 
diplomacy is facing the same problems and challenges as those of other aspects 
of sustainable development governance. These challenges relate to the increas-
ing complexity of GFG: (i) complexity of issues, interlinkages, fragmentation, 
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and  proliferation of arenas, (ii) complexity of actors and lack of cooperation and 
coordination, and (iii) complexity of instruments and lack of implementation. 
This paper argues that instead of asking how the fragmented and complex GFG 
system can be restructured into a top-down regime, reformers should embrace 
complexity; rather than restructuring from the bottom up, we suggest build-
ing upon the existing regime complex and designing incremental changes to 
the existing mix of regime elements, thus overcoming their fragmentation. In 
sum, this paper seeks to do two things. First, it introduces the complex and 
fragmented institutional configuration of international forest policy. Second, it 
attempts to identify lessons learned and to develop a range of recommendations 
if the world were to construct a truly “green economy” over the next 20 to 40 
years, building upon the analysis of GFG. 
CoMPlexity oF issues
As many commentators have argued, a paradigm shift is needed in the way land 
is used and commodities are produced. Demand for agricultural commodities 
and timber will continue to rise as the world population grows and becomes 
wealthier. The world today faces one of the biggest challenges of the 21st cen-
tury: how to feed nine billion 
people in 2050 in the face of 
climate change, economic 
and financial crises, and grow-
ing competition for the use of 
natural resources. As a result, 
the competing claims for land 
use will increase the pressure 
on forests worldwide when the potential of agricultural productivity enhance-
ment is not fully captured. In the absence of an incentive system, in a “business 
as usual” world, it is estimated that around 60 percent of tropical forests are at 
risk of deforestation over the long term.4  Improvements in agriculture productiv-
ity and the sustainable management of forests need to play a key role in GFG.
In this context, it is important to realize that forest issues are complex and have 
multiple perspectives and linkages to the full range of sustainable development 
issues, such as poverty reduction and livelihoods, trade and economic develop-
ment, security, biodiversity, and climate change. To handle this complexity, GFG 
has shifted over time to better address emerging priorities. Looking at GFG, the 
emergence of new dominant ideas have shaped—and reshaped—forest policy.  
It is important to realize that forest issues are 
complex and have multiple perspectives and 
linkages to the full range of sustainable devel-
opment issues, such as poverty reduction and 
livelihoods, trade and economic development, 
security, biodiversity, and climate change.
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Over the last 40 years, these shifts have transformed forest policy from a “com-
modity issue” into a “biodiversity issue,” “a sustainable development issue,” and 
“a human rights issue,” among others.5  It is therefore clear that the system of GFG 
impacts—and is impacted by—much more than just the forest sector or those living 
inside the forests. It is connected with human well-being, both for forest- and 
non-forest-dwellers, international trade, human health, economic growth and 
development, natural resources and ecosystem health, and human security. 
This complexity challenges the current system of GFG and does not allow for 
continued “siloed” governance responses or single-lens viewpoints of forest issues. 
A critical determinant of success is to manage, rather than eliminate, complexity, 
and apply a coherent approach to address the broad range of issues therein. As 
we will argue below, this will require a new governance approach that matches 
the complexity of our management system to the complexity of the problem. 
Success depends on the development of such new approaches to governance.
CoMPlexity oF aCtors
Global debates on sustainable development—including debates on forests—have 
been largely characterized as a collective debate between the rich and poor coun-
tries, along the North/South divide.6 This dichotomous view has largely centered 
on binary distinctions between the North and the South, or—in the forest con-
text—countries with tropical forests with high rates of deforestation and countries 
with boreal and temperate forests with low deforestation rates. As such, it has 
resulted in high tensions, difficult-to-bridge divisions, and a general inability to 
look at forest issues as a whole. Until now, GFG has been highly state-oriented. A 
lack of coherency in state approaches in the international arena adds to the fail-
ure of the current GFG. This also accounts for the lack of real involvement from 
the private sector, civil society, and NGOs in the negotiation and decision-making 
processes. Last but not least, the myriad of international organizations in a cur-
rent struggle to position themselves makes the system even more complex. 
GFG, by its very nature, includes a vast array of actors that vary widely in their 
type, specific interests, and goals. They represent a wide range of entities—from 
global institutions to local civic groups, national governments to indigenous 
peoples, and large multinational businesses to small landholders dependent 
on forest products. As demonstrated in scholarly work on revolving complex-
ity theory, actors within the GFG system do not appreciate complexity and 
non-linearity. Complexity is regarded as a source of failure and as something 
that should be reduced or “fixed.”7 However, actors connect which each other in 
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myriad ways around multiple components of the evolving GFG agenda. There is 
nearly full consensus among scholars as well as practitioners of GFG on the need 
to incorporate a broader array of actors—beyond state actors—and their wider 
range of interests for more effective global governance.8 Discussions couched in 
the language of “multi-stakeholder involvement,” “public-private partnerships,” 
or “broad participation” all emanate from the realization that meaningful global 
action requires more than the participation of states. States are no less important 
today than they were in the past, but they are no longer the only actor group 
that influences global challenges.9  While states once played the dominant role 
in global governance, as issues have multiplied and the interconnections among 
them have grown more complex, other actors, including international organi-
zations; private sector, civil society organizations; and consumers, have also 
become significant actors in designing and implementing the system of GFG.
CoMPlexity oF PoliCy instruMentation
The multiplicity of issues, users, uses, and views of forests has led to myriad 
governance mechanisms, instruments, and diverse approaches to the implemen-
tation and enforcement of sustainable forest management. The proliferation of 
international instruments, especially treaties or conventions concerning GFG, and 
the lack of means of implementation have complicated the issue, making effec-
tive governance more difficult at all levels. Scholars and policy practitioners have 
become increasingly concerned about the “messiness” of the GFG system. Among 
the issues of concern, the following themes are identified as having special 
 relevance to explaining the ineffectiveness of the current system of GFG:
• Scale of governance/subsidiarity. Political decisions are being negotiated in 
new modes of governance that depart from conventional, hierarchical legisla-
tion using regulations and directives. Based on previous analysis, however, we 
argue that GFG has been too focused at the apex, or the global policy level, 
even when issues of actual implementation are neither best understood nor 
best implemented at that level. Furthermore, it is important to realize that 
UN headquarters discussions generally tend to operate in a particular logic of 
global inter-state politics.10  
• Treaty congestion is a prominent problem afflicting GFG. Over the course of a 
few decades, the GFG system has created messiness, incoherence, and confusion 
that incites demands for centralization in decision-making. Furthermore, a lack 
of means of implementation, especially funds, made real implementation almost 
impossible. Negotiators mainly focus on Oversees Development Assistance (ODA) 
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while other available funds are never looked at. Only recently has the search for 
new and additional resources, as well as innovative approaches, started.11 
• Institutional and policy fragmentation has resulted from policy being 
dispersed not only among ever-more-specialized treaty bodies, such as the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), but also geographically as the 
institutions managing these policies get fragmented by having to operate in 
different political, normative, and geographical contexts.
• Negotiation fatigue is increasing and states, especially developing countries, 
struggle to meet institutional demands as the number of institutions and interna-
tional agreements increases. A general sense of negotiation fatigue is now appar-
ent among seasoned sustainable development negotiators. Reasons behind this 
include missing unified concepts or methodology, a variable sense of urgency, lack 
of political support, lack of means of implementation, and lack of leadership.12 
transForMinG GFG: a Call For neW diPloMaCy
As the first decade of the 21st century comes to a close, the world faces mount-
ing challenges characterized by the intensifying interconnectedness of global and 
regional issues. These challenges, as introduced above, are particularly pertinent 
in the realm of GFG. How, then, do we move towards creating better decisions and 
more effective institutions for the global governance of forests? Putting in place an 
effective GFG governance system requires taking a long-term view of where we are 
going and where we need to be. It also means starting now with what is immedi-
ately possible while building transition pathways to what is ultimately necessary. 
In this, we assert that imperfections or uncertainties are no excuse for inaction or 
short-sightedness, but rather a reason for vision and innovation. 
The record of attempted replacement strategies at the international level in 
order to create an integrated, legally binding forest regime has not been promis-
ing. The most promising alternative to designing a global forest governance 
system that addresses the multiple societal objectives is not to replace the 
existing regime complex, but rather to manage the existing governance system 
better. To do this, we offer two propositions and five building blocks collectively 
comprising a transformed system of GFG: 
• First, with any given challenge, the complexity of the solution has to match the 
complexity of the problem. The current GFG system has the tendency to simplify 
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the problem in order to make the problem “more manageable.” Our assertion 
is that effective GFG will come not from addressing any one (or a few) of these 
elements, but from systematically tackling these myriad elements of global gov-
ernance together and, more importantly, the linkages between them. However, 
addressing these linkages makes the global governance of forests what social 
scientists call a “wicked problem”13: a problem which is inherently complex and 
to which there are no simple solutions because of complex interconnections.
• The second proposition flows directly from the above and posits the need for 
a “new diplomacy” that recognizes not only the inherent complexity of the 
issue but also the changed realities of GFG. Diplomacy provides us with the 
context and tools for global governance. The nature of the forest issue, and its 
many complex inter-linkages to a whole host of other issues (climate change, 
biodiversity, trade, etc.), raises challenges for traditional practices of state 
diplomacy with its focus on single solutions to complex problems. 
In the context of these propositions, building on the analysis of GFG, the following 
building blocks must be designed if the world is to construct a truly “green econ-
omy” over the next 20 to 40 years. The points we raise here are especially pertinent 
in the context of forests, but they are not unique to the forest issue. Indeed, it is 
our contention that forests are not atypical at all. Instead, they are an exemplar of 
a new set of complex global problems (including, for example, climate change, 
global finance, and food security) that are calling for an alternative approach to 
diplomacy—an approach that embraces the complexity of today’s problems, is not 
state-centric, involves a multitude of stakeholders, operates differently at different 
policy scales, and seeks an array of appropriate toolkits rather than single solutions. 
This alternative approach towards a green economy—which we label “a new diplo-
macy for global forest governance”—consists of the following five building blocks.
1. appropriate scale and subsidiarity
As we claimed above, the system of GFG has been too focused on the global level. 
The recognition that not everything can be resolved from within the UN system 
implies two very important aspects in how a new model for global forest gover-
nance might operate. First, it implies that while not all issues can be resolved from 
within the UN, some issues can—and, maybe, some issues can only be resolved 
from there. Second, it implies that a first step in the new diplomacy on global for-
est governance should be to determine what the appropriate level of discourse and 
action is for which discussion (i.e., the principle of subsidiarity).
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2. developing institutional space
Following other scholarly work, we assert that the system of GFG has evolved 
into something far more complex than it was even recently.14  Based on our anal-
ysis, we believe that the evolution continues and is likely to continue into the 
future.15 The proliferation of arenas where forest governance is being discussed 
could lead to significant management problems. While multiple arenas provide 
the ability to deal with different levels of the complexity at different forums, 
they also require a system of inter-arena coordination. We claim that any efforts 
to “manage” all the myriad issues related to forests (agriculture, climate change, 
security etc.) within a single institutional framework will lead to an ineffective 
governance system. An alternative model would focus on a governance system 
that can create enough coherence, interaction, and coordination between the 
various arenas that they all act towards a common goal.
3. deeper stakeholder Participation
For a GFG system to become more effective, we assert that we need new and 
innovative ways of thinking about what “participation” in GFG really means 
for different actors. A critical determinant for success for a more effective GFG 
system is to invest in a new diplomacy that allows multiple opportunities for 
multiple actors; here the notion is to provide different actors with the ability to 
be involved at the levels where they have the most competence and capacity to 
influence GFG. Our proposition is not to categorically exclude some actors from 
global diplomacy. At the same time, we should depart from the widely shared 
notion that “all relevant stakeholders” should be involved in all policy decisions.
4. Policy instrumentation: development of a Portfolio approach
From nearly 20 years of accumulated experience in trying to negotiate a “treaty,” 
we now know that an overarching agreement that addresses all the related issues 
is unlikely. We assert that the complexity issues and the myriad linkages to other 
challenging issues—such as climate change—militate against a single treaty solution 
and instead call for a more nuanced set of cross-linkages with other issues and the 
conventions and treaties that govern them. We claim that the governance challenge 
for the future is not one of negotiating a new grand instrument, but of coordinat-
ing multiple existing and new initiatives. The fixation with searching for hard law 
solutions needs to be nuanced with recognition that an array of soft law instruments 
might be more effective than a single, comprehensive hard law instrument. Based 
on our earlier research, such a “portfolio approach” could consist of using a com-
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bination of initiatives to raise a variety of resources including monetary resources, 
knowledge resources, capacity development, public support, and awareness-raising 
for effective global action on forests.16 To be effective, such a portfolio approach 
requires adaptive governance in order to adjust to new conditions flexibly.
5. leadership
Our final building block centers around the notion of leadership and its impact 
on the system of GFG. Much scholarly work has underscored the importance 
of effective leadership in global public goods arrangements.17 Leaders in the 
global forest governance arena are neither representatives of hegemony who 
can impose their will on others, nor ethically motivated actors who seek to 
fashion workable institutional arrangements as contributions to the common 
good. Effective leadership requires a truly global and inclusive mindset to turn 
the notion of traditional diplomacy on its head, building upon the recognition 
that the complexity of our evolving and polycentric governance systems is here 
to stay. In this, the leadership required has to be bold and innovative enough 
because the long-term challenges of sustainable development are big enough.
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9.  transitioning to a Green economy:  
Citizens and Civil society
by Paul Wapner
The need to build a green economy is obvious. Much of the world produces, 
buys, sells, and uses goods and services in ways that enhance injustice and 
undermine the organic infrastructure that supports life on earth. 
Civil society plays a key role in prodding societies toward a just and green future. 
While far from enlightened or powerful enough to single-handedly create a green 
economy, civil society, nonetheless, represents a necessary component of transi-
tion. This paper briefly outlines the promise of civil society. It begins by describ-
ing the components of a green economy and the obstacles toward bringing one 
about. It then explains analytically the potentialities of civil society and offers a 
set of specific initiatives for enhancing civil efforts to build a green economy.
What is a Green eConoMy?
A green economy ensures fair use of ecological resources and sinks at re-generational 
and bio-assimilation rates. Building such an economy entails the following 
 components:  
1. Full-cost pricing: Incorporate ecological degradation into the cost of goods 
and services (with compensation for the poor).  
2. Waste = Food: Design production to reuse all pre- and post-consumer waste 
as industrial or biological inputs.1 
3. Sustainable ethic: Foster cultures that recognize ecological scarcity and 
inspire consumers and producers to desire only what is most necessary and 
ecologically sustainable. 
4. Progressive green taxes: Tax resource and sink use instead of income. 
5. Wealth = Environmental Health: Create measures of value that preserve the 
intrinsic worth of nature.
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obstaCles
The rich rule the world. Economic power too easily translates into political and 
cultural power; thus we have financier rather than philosopher or otherwise 
enlightened kings. This raises troubling questions about transitioning to a green 
economy. Can the rich always know what is best for themselves, much less 
the poor or our common planet? If their wealth results largely from industries 
and practices that undermine ecological stability, will the rich alter economic 
structures? Furthermore, insofar as most people’s short-term economic fate is 
associated with the continued well-being of the rich, can a green transformation 
occur when most of us are implicated in ecological degradation?  
Further complications include the specific challenge of incorporating social and 
environmental justice concerns into the world economy. Economies operate 
largely according to supply and demand, and thus they are often tone deaf to 
social justice and ecological 
protection. Justice influences 
economic calculation only 
when extra-market forces 
are extraordinarily power-
ful and governments impose 
economic restrictions on 
unfair practices. Ecological constraints only breach market dynamics in the form 
of prices that rarely represent actual ecological costs. Consequently, we face a 
situation in which extra-market forces must be marshaled on behalf of a green 
economy, even though few forms of power are more commanding and expan-
sive in scope than market ones.  
Civil soCiety
Building a green economy thus rests on embedding the global financial system 
within a broader socio-ecological frame of reference and practice. We need to 
cultivate a vibrant extra-market realm of life that gives relevant and effective 
expression to non-commercial concerns—principally focused on social justice 
and environmental sanity. This is a tall order because, as mentioned, economic 
power is often hegemonic, with the ability to dictate governmental and cultural 
forms of governance.
Civil society represents a realm that is largely outside immediate commercial and 
even governmental pressures. It is populated by various associations that work 
We face a situation in which extra-market 
forces must be marshaled on behalf of a 
green economy, even though few forms of 
power are more commanding and expan-
sive in scope than market ones.
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within and across societies in the service of particular public ideals or enterprises. 
The specifically public dimension suggests that civil society actors are motivated 
fundamentally not by economic profit, while the transnational character of civil 
society suggests a sovereignty-free orientation.2 To be sure, civil society actors 
are not wholly autonomous from the world economy or the nation-state system. 
Indeed, civil society often reflects the same power dynamics that define these 
other two spheres. However, analytically it is distinct enough that forces and initia-
tives can arise within civil society that are at odds with contemporary governmen-
tal or commercial norms and practices, and this partial independence provides 
civil society actors with a unique purchase point on world affairs in general and 
global environmental issues in particular. To the degree that their efforts—which 
include everything from pressuring governments to shifting codes of good con-
duct—influence economic calculation and the dynamics of commercial life, civil 
society becomes a necessary agent of transition to a green economy.
FroM ProMise to PraCtiCe
To boost the hope of civil society, we need new and stronger institutions to 
empower civil society actors. These institutions must translate the aspirations of 
social and environmental justice emergent in civil society into forms of gov-
ernance that can both penetrate and direct economic life. What follows, then, 
are proposals for how to build and strengthen civil society institutions that can 
facilitate a green economic transformation.
Civilian Corps Service Responsibility (CCSR): Many countries require or 
encourage citizens to serve the nation in one form or another. This can include 
everything from military drafts to civilian service organizations. Such service not 
only assists in public welfare—by meeting critical community needs in educa-
tion, health and public safety—but also provides an education and sense of 
national investment by participants.  
The United States initiated the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1933 as a work 
relief program wherein unemployed youth were enlisted to implement a natural 
resource conservation program.  Participants planted three billion trees, con-
structed more than 800 state parks, and built infrastructure to make public lands 
accessible. The program also built awareness and appreciation of America’s 
natural beauty and resources among the population.3  
A similar program in which youth serve for a year as stewards of the land could 
arise within countries around the world. Citizens would work as public servants 
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at water treatment plants, waste disposal sites, farms, environmental remedia-
tion areas, and urban transportation centers. This would give youths a sense of 
contemporary ecological challenges and enlist them in helping countries meet 
their provisioning needs in a sustainable fashion. Indeed, since more than half 
the world’s population lives in cities, people are increasingly unaware of the 
sources of their water and food products and the disposal sites for their waste. 
A CCSR would provide an experiential sustainability education to a nation’s citi-
zens, as well as create a steady cadre of workers committed to natural resource 
protection.
While civilian corps systems have historically been national in scope, there is 
reason to expand them beyond national boundaries. A transnational, regional, or 
even global service in which people serve in the world’s ecological hotspots would 
provide a steady stream of sustainability workers, expand global consciousness 
about environmental interconnections, and help build a global community—all of 
which are crucial to increasing civil society pressure on the world economy.  
International Food and Product Label Standardization Program: Full cost or 
sustainability-sensitive pricing is impossible without accurate information about 
ecological costs. To move toward an accurate pricing system, the international 
community can adopt product-labeling standards. 
At a minimum, labels should indicate the source of ingredients to specify that 
the ultimate foundation of products is the earth itself. Computers, dry wall, pot-
tery, food, and paper do not materialize from the sheer ingenuity of humans, but 
rather from the living earth. Minerals, water, animals, plants, and microorgan-
isms are the building blocks of our consumptive material world. Being reminded 
of this in a systematic way could contribute to civic environmental responsibility 
and, by extension, civil pressure on the global economic market.  
In 2009, Sweden began providing carbon emission ratings for food in addition 
to nutritional information. This effort sought to encourage Swedes to consider 
the health of the planet along with their individual health decisions.4 Calculating 
the carbon emissions from food production is still fraught with challenges, and 
there are many potentially unjust consequences involved with consumers shift-
ing their buying habits based on such labeling. However, the effort is useful for 
reducing Sweden’s carbon emissions sourced from food production.  
The transnationalization of such a system would encourage consumers and 
producers to make more mindful choices in the marketplace. Food labels could 
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include information about not only the ecological components of products and 
sustainable disposal options, but also the fairness of production practices (as in 
today’s fair-trade certified labels). 
Corporate Responsibility Charter (CRC)5:  Corporations in many countries are 
legally afforded the same (if not more) rights, and are required to assume the 
same (if not fewer) responsibilities, as citizens. This corrupts politics and licenses 
corporate irresponsibility.  
For example, in democracies where corporations enjoy the right to free speech 
(and where money is considered a form of speech), corporate financial power 
influences elections and policy-making. Additionally, most corporate charters 
legally circumscribe liability such that shareholders stand to lose only their 
investments and employees only their jobs if a corporation fails to protect its 
own or the public’s interests. These common laws shield corporations from 
public welfare accountability. 
A CRC would require all corporations with gross receipts in excess of $100 mil-
lion to obtain a renewable corporate charter to do business within and across 
national boundaries. Multinational panels of citizens, serving in the same capac-
ity as citizen jurors, would act as grantors. These panels would evaluate corpo-
rate behavior to ensure acceptable environmental and ethical business practices. 
Earth Flag6: The absence of global solidarity among sovereign states under-
mines the possibility of a strong, global environmental ethic and thus efforts 
toward creating a global green economy. States pursue their national interest 
often devoid of global concern. A country’s flag—its patriotic symbol—thus serves 
as a powerful instrument for cultivating global consciousness and building 
momentum for a green world economy.  
By sewing a small image of the globe in the corner of their existing flags, 
countries could demonstrate their solidarity with the ecological imperative that 
national concerns dovetail with global ones. In this way, citizens could com-
memorate their nation’s uniqueness while acknowledging and celebrating their 
interdependence with others. Such citizen consciousness could heighten global 
civil society’s pressures for a green economy.
the iMPortanCe oF Civil soCiety
Civil society is no panacea to the challenges of transitioning to a green economy. 
Associations within civil society often enjoy parochial interests (even if they 
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express themselves in public good terms), and the realm itself lacks sufficient 
power to alter the deeply entrenched structures of the world economy. Indeed, 
more often than not, civil society is the tail being wagged by the economic dog. 
However, there are still pock-
ets of collective life amidst 
commercial hegemony that 
occasionally enjoy critical 
distance in which people 
can imagine and disseminate 
alternative practices, and the hope of transitioning to a green economy depends 
partly upon such pockets. Put differently, the activation of civil society in the 
service of environmental protection is a necessary component of transitioning to 
a green economy, even if it is not sufficient.  
The measures suggested above may sound naïve given their small interventions 
into the monumental character of the world economy. They may seem, at most, 
like quaint gestures with no ability to genuinely shift environmental affairs. This 
would be a semi-accurate read. However, another interpretation would suggest 
that they nevertheless represent genuine intrusions into the matrix of our socio-
economic lives, and thus have the ability to stir ideas and practices. In the same 
way that civil society reflects the power dynamics of the world economy and the 
nation-state system, the world economy is partially reflective of what happens 
in these other two realms. Thus, civil society provides part of the basic context 
within which the world economy operates. Coloring this context in green is 
crucial for building any semblance of a green economy.
1  The phrase “waste=food” comes from: McDonough, W. and M. Braungart. 2002. Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the 
Way We Make Things. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 92ff.  
2  Rosenau, J. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p 36.
3  Williams, G. W. and A. Shapiro. 2008. The Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Forests. March 21. 
Available online at:  http://tinyurl.com/USFS-CCC.
4  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. 2009. Sweden Tells All With CO2 Emissions 
Food Labels. Bridges Trade BioRes, November 13, 9 (20): 10.
5  This idea draws on the work of Michael Lerner and the Network of Spiritual Progressives. See, e.g., Network of 
Spiritual Progressives. 2010. Environmental and Social Responsibility Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Tikkun 
Magazine, September/October, pp. 33–38.
6  Professor Daniel Deudney, currently of the Political Science Department at Johns Hopkins University, proposed 
a variant of this idea in the 1990s.
The activation of civil society in the service 
of environmental protection is a  necessary 
component of transitioning to a green 
economy, even if it is not sufficient.
Beyond Rio+20: Governance for a Green Economy     83
10.  Private sector Governance for a sustainable 
economy: a strategic approach
by David Levy 
A global transition to a sustainable economy requires the large-scale mobiliza-
tion of our financial, technological, and organizational resources. Climate change 
is one of the major concerns of this century, and it has been estimated that 
annual global investment of more than $500 billion will be needed over the com-
ing decades to keep warming within a two-degrees-Celcius limit. The vast scale 
of these investments and the need to integrate sustainable technologies, prac-
tices, and products across the supply chains of every economic sector highlight 
the importance of creating governance structures that will redirect corporate 
resources toward sustainability. 
Growing concern about an international “governance deficit” has fuelled this 
embrace of private resources and capacity. It is important, however, to recognize 
that large companies are already, de facto, highly engaged in the fabric of global 
environmental governance 
systems in their roles as pol-
luters, investors, innovators, 
lobbyists, and marketers. Pri-
vate decisions over products 
and processes, technologies 
and research, and distribution 
and sourcing have vast environmental consequences with wide societal ramifica-
tions and broad geographic reach.1 
Here I use the term “global governance” in the broadest sense to mean “the rules, 
institutions, and norms that order, channel, and constrain economic activity 
and its impacts in relation to international issues of public concern.” It therefore 
includes not only regulation and formal international agreements, but also private 
mechanisms such as codes of conduct, discursive and normative frames, and 
market structures.2 This expands on the conventional understanding of multi-actor, 
multi-level governance to emphasize three primary channels of governance, which 
Private decisions over products and pro-
cesses, technologies and research, and 
distribution and sourcing have vast envi-
ronmental consequences with wide societal 
ramifications and broad geographic reach.
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correspond to the pillars of stability in a particular arena or “organizational field”: 
economic/technological, political/regulatory, and discursive/cultural.3 
the CoMPlexity oF Carbon loCk-in
Governance is thus a matrix of forces, actors, and institutions that stabilize a 
field in a particular way. Governance does not necessarily guarantee an outcome 
that serves the public interest. It is our current governance systems over energy 
and transportation that produce carbon lock-in, the “interlocking technological, 
institutional and social forces…that perpetuate fossil fuel-based infrastructures 
in spite of their known environmental externalities.”4 Lock-in is more than an 
economic and technological phenomenon. Institutions such as the mass media, 
unions, government agencies, and professional certification bodies  generate 
standards, rules, norms, routines and cultural practices that stabilize the domi-
nant technologies. The automobile, for example, is intimately connected to our 
patterns of work, leisure, and shopping. Organizations with vested interests 
associated with existing technologies, such as industry associations and unions, 
become powerful actors who perpetuate the status quo. 
A structural understanding of governance highlights the complexity, inter-
dependencies, and inertia of the current system, and thus, the challenges 
of a sustainability transition. Against this background, what governance 
institutions and mechanisms could generate change? Here we must heed 
 Machiavelli’s warning to avoid wishful thinking and start with the world as 
it is. It is pointless to preach to consumers to abandon their cars and plane 
travel, or to admonish companies to give priority to sustainability. Economic 
activity is deeply embedded in economic and social institutions, and compa-
nies are constrained by corporate governance, capital markets, competition, 
and the wider consumer culture. 
Existing governance institutions are also embedded in the current system, so it is 
naïve to simply specify “ideal” governance institutions that would, for example, 
create a high global price for carbon, mandate clean production systems, and 
empower non-financial stakeholders. Meaningful change requires careful study of 
the contested terrain of corporate environmental practice and governance, and a 
long-term strategy to win new allies, reframe the issues, shift norms, realign eco-
nomic incentives, and craft new rules and oversight mechanisms. This represents 
a strategic approach to building governance for a green economy. 
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FroM reGulatory to radiCal: Four aPProaChes
Four governance mechanisms can potentially shift corporate behavior toward 
sustainability. First, regulation can direct companies to meet specific goals, such 
as renewables in the power sector, or fuel efficiency for vehicles. Second, eco-
nomic incentives for sustainability can be structured through taxes, subsidies, or 
new financial instruments such as carbon markets. Third, public pressures can 
lead companies to shift their norms and practices, for example, by embracing 
information disclosure initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The fourth and most radical approach 
is to restructure the foundations of corporate governance so that productive orga-
nizations internalize the drive to serve multiple stakeholders and goals, includ-
ing the workforce, the community, and the environment. 
Each of these approaches has possibilities and limitations. Regulation is the most 
traditional means of influencing corporate behavior, but it can face huge political 
hurdles, as illustrated by the current post-Kyoto climate regime quagmire and 
inaction in the U.S. Congress. Regulation not only generates corporate opposition 
but also frequently faces reluctance from politicians more concerned about com-
petitiveness and employment than sustainability. Some have made a spirited 
argument for a Global Environmental Organization to overcome problems of 
collective action and coordinate national regulation, but others are wary of the 
centralization of unaccountable power.5
Providing economic incentives harnesses the private sector’s profit motive, but 
these incentives are often driven by political rather than environmental consid-
erations, as in the case of ethanol subsidies. They can have unintended and per-
verse impacts, such as providing incentives through carbon credits for expand-
ing the manufacture of air conditioning. They strain governmental budgets and 
are frequently opposed by vested interests.  
The move toward social and environmental disclosure represents a form of 
informational governance or “civil regulation” that some herald as a new era of 
transparency, accountability, and stakeholder engagement.6 Critics have argued 
that disclosure is actually a privatized form of voluntary self-governance that 
protects against more onerous regulation and accomplishes little for sustainabil-
ity or democratic ideals.7 
Disclosure is, indeed, a contested form of governance in which the non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) who promote initiatives such as CDP seek not only 
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to change corporate practices but also to empower civil society actors as active 
partners in corporate decision-making.8 Simultaneously, business strives to 
promote a more corporate version of disclosure geared toward management of 
reputation, liability, energy costs, and investor relations.
These three mechanisms for promoting sustainability—regulation, economic 
incentives, and increased disclosure programs—leave intact the fundamental 
structures of corporate governance in which companies strive to maximize 
profits and are accountable to capital markets, both through the formal legal 
structures of shareholders and boards of directors and functionally through the 
operations of investment analysts and bond ratings. Any attempt to divert com-
panies from this goal inevitably faces resistance, and companies are frequently 
able to thwart, weaken, or skirt regulation through the deployment of lawyers, 
lobbyists, and accountants.  
Sustainability advocates enthusiastically make the “win-win” case that improv-
ing environmental disclosure and practice actually raises financial perfor-
mance; indeed, the core strategy of GRI and CDP has been to enlist investors 
as key allies in creating a demand for disclosure. While there is certainly some 
low-lying fruit in the energy area, relying on the harmony of private interests 
and planetary sustainability, with vague appeals to the long run, seems rather 
dubious and ignores the massive environmental externalities of our industrial 
production and mass consumption. Studies of the relationship between environ-
mental and financial performance offer little evidence for the “win-win” case.  
The fourth and most radical approach is to reengineer structures of governance 
so that organizations internalize not just environmental costs but the sustain-
ability mission itself. A variety of experiments are under way with organizational 
forms that attempt to combine the economic efficiency and market orientation 
of the private sector with 
the concern for social and 
environmental goals of not-
for-profit organizations. The 
Corporation 20/20 initiative 
has brought together a range 
of ideas about governance 
structures to promote a “Great 
Transition” to a more sustainable society. Marjorie Kelly of the Tellus Institute, co-
founder of Corporation 20/20, has described a three-part typology of structures 
A variety of experiments are under way with 
organizational forms that attempt to com-
bine the economic efficiency and market 
orientation of the private sector with the 
concern for social and environmental goals 
of not-for-profit organizations.
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of “for-Benefit companies”: Stakeholder-Owned Companies, Mission-Controlled 
Companies, and Public-Private Hybrids. “The essential framework of such a 
company—its ownership, governance, capitalization, and compensation struc-
tures—is designed to support this dual mission.”9 
The ambitious agenda of Corporation 20/20 hints at the hurdles it faces. Some 
of the organizations Kelly describes deliberately limit their dividends, profit-
ability targets, and growth rates in order to address their goals. Building an 
economy based on such organizations would therefore require a revolution in 
capital markets. While some investment funds apply social screens, constraints 
on pursuit of returns are anathema to capital markets. The transition toward 
regarding stakeholders, such as labor and environmental groups, as active par-
ticipants in decisions rather than actors to be consulted and managed is likewise 
a revolution that overthrows shareholder supremacy and replaces it with a more 
complex and multi-layered form of governance. 
a strateGiC shiFt is neCessary
Yet even if most organizations were environmentally aware and followed best 
practice, there is no guarantee that the global economy would be sustainable at 
a planetary level. As John Ehrenfeld, sustainability scholar and current execu-
tive director of the International Society for Industrial Ecology, has described, 
sustainability is a systems-level phenomenon based on the balance of human 
activities and the earth’s natural processes.10 The sum total of global production 
and consumption, from cars and planes to food and energy, puts an intolerable 
strain on the earth’s capacity to provide fresh water and absorb carbon dioxide 
and other pollutants. This is becoming strikingly clear with the rapid industrial-
ization of China, India, and Brazil. Moreover, the redesign of our cities, transpor-
tation systems, and energy infrastructure requires such a massive scale of invest-
ment and regional planning that individual business organizations, however well 
intentioned, cannot meet the challenge. Clearly, we need sectoral, national, and 
global institutions that can play a role in planning, coordinating, and financing 
the transition.
Several writers brought together under the Corporation 20/20 initiative recognize 
this wider context and the need for macro-level governance.11 Tellus Institute 
Senior Fellow Richard Rosen, for example, draws from experience with the 
U.S. Public Utility Commissions to suggest paths to democratizing decisions at 
the sectoral level pertaining to capital investments, technologies, and pricing 
in basic industrial and service sectors. Paul Epstein, associate director of the 
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Center for Health and the Global Environment at Harvard Medical School, calls 
for a new Bretton Woods to reshape institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, 
and WTO to align the global financial architecture with sustainable development 
goals. This would entail strengthening and enhancing funding for existing institu-
tions with a sustainability mission, such as UNEP and GEF, and restructuring 
other organizations. John Stutz of the Tellus Institute and Boston College sociol-
ogy professor Juliet Schor, among others, have argued for a far-reaching cultural 
transformation that displaces consumption and growth from its central place in 
our economy and society.
Yet here again we should to heed Machiavelli’s warning and consider a strategy 
for getting there from here. There are tensions between the more incremental 
yet practicable changes to governance structures and more radical plans that 
are unlikely to gain traction. 
Some of the most intriguing 
initiatives, such as the GRI 
and the CDP, have tried to 
negotiate these tensions in a 
strategic, dynamic manner. 
These disclosure-based governance projects have been remarkably successful in 
galvanizing voluntary compliance among many of the largest companies. Most 
notably, the leaders of these initiatives forged wide coalitions, including NGOs, 
businesses, accountants, consultants, and investors, and attempted to appeal to 
the diverse interests and goals of these actors. 
The core strategy for CDP, which is largely modeled on GRI, is to recruit institu-
tional investors to pressure companies in which they hold investments to report 
using the disclosure protocol. For investors, the claim is that the information is 
valuable in signaling the degree of carbon risk. To appeal to the NGO commu-
nity and multilateral organizations such as UNEP, carbon disclosure is framed 
as advancing an agenda of corporate accountability and more inclusive and 
transparent governance. The CDP, along with GRI, would provide a standardized 
format to reduce compliance costs, but also enable comparison across firms. 
This would reward strong performers with reputational benefits while enabling 
NGOs to exert pressure on non-disclosers and poor performers.
Advocates of corporate social reporting frame it discursively in “win-win” terms 
as satisfying environmental, social, and economic goals in a way that would 
appeal to a diverse array of actors. Carbon disclosure, for example, is presented 
There are tensions between the more in-
cremental yet practicable changes to gov-
ernance structures and more radical plans 
that are unlikely to gain traction.
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as an element of social and environmental responsibility and reporting, a 
broader project that already has widespread acceptance among business, gov-
ernment, and civil society actors. 
Simultaneously, CDP founders have been skillful in framing carbon disclosure 
slightly differently for different audiences. For the business and financial com-
munity, carbon disclosure is portrayed as an extension of financial reporting, 
drawing from its legitimacy as a routine practice with companies, investors, and 
regulatory authorities. For businesses wary of mandatory carbon regulation, 
voluntary disclosure offers positive publicity and flexibility in implementation 
with little legal exposure. Carbon disclosure is also framed as serving the mate-
rial interests of industry and finance through carbon trading, risk management, 
streamlined reporting, and energy savings. For accounting, IT, and consulting 
firms, the measurement and management of carbon flows presents a vast new 
market opportunity. 
CDP has gained widespread acceptance, but it has not eliminated the fundamen-
tal tensions in this contested field. These tensions, or “competing logics,” arise 
from the diversity of forms and purposes of carbon accounting and disclosure, 
and the related interests of the actors involved. The logic of ”civil regulation” 
views carbon disclosure as a mechanism to empower civil society groups to play 
a more assertive role in corporate governance, increasing the transparency and 
accountability of corporations to external stakeholders. The implicit goal is a 
more fundamental shift in the balance of power toward civil society. The logic of 
“corporate environmental performance,” by contrast, relies on the instrumental 
value of carbon disclosure to business through the management of energy costs, 
compliance, and reputation.
The strategic compromises and fragile coalitions necessary to initiate a wide-
spread shift in business practice inherently generate pressures that circumscribe 
more systematic transformation. In this case, the strategy of positioning carbon 
disclosure as integral to carbon markets and management has resulted in the 
dominance of market-oriented managerialism. Carbon information seems to 
hold the most potential value for corporate managers and accountants, consul-
tants, and software companies, who are emerging as the dominant partners in 
the carbon disclosure movement. Neither investors nor NGOs have much use 
for aggregate data, which, it turns out, is not particularly valuable for activist 
campaigns or valuing assets. 
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While carbon disclosure has not transformed corporate governance, it has 
scored important strategic gains. It has generated legitimacy for the principle 
of disclosure and accountability to external stakeholders, and increased the 
visibility and voice of environmental advocates inside and outside corporations. 
It has generated considerable momentum toward the formalization of carbon 
accounting standards, standards currently crossing over into the regulatory 
apparatus of agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Environmental Protection Agency. Perhaps most importantly, carbon disclosure 
has demonstrated the feasibility of carbon management and potential corporate 
benefits, shifting the field of play and opening political space for further action. 
It suggests how a strategic approach to building structures of governance might 
chart a trajectory toward taming the powerful locomotive of corporate produc-
tive and creative energies and redirect them toward building a green economy. 
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